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A THRICE-TOLD TALE, OR FELIX THE CAT
Michael Ariens*
Few legal scholars would dispute the constitutional, historical, and political importance of the events of 1937, when the Supreme Court, faced with
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's plan to reorganize the federal judiciary, ultimately approved a sweeping interpretation of governmental authority to implement socioeconomic legislation. The course of events, although frequently canvassed, has yielded conflicting interpretations of the
actions and motivations of the Justices who took part in the fabled "switch
in time that saved nine." In this Article, Professor Ariens argues that Felix
Frankfurterplayed a pivotal role in disseminatinga particularhistory of the
events of 1937. Reversing his own privately expressed position of dismay at
the Court's actions in 1937, Frankfurter, in a memorial tribute to Justice
Owen Roberts in 1955, revised the history of the events of 1937, a history
that placed the Court above the fray of politics in its decisionmaking. Professor Ariens argues that the events of 1954-z959, the era of Brown v. Board
of Education, played an integralpart in shaping Frankfurter'srevised history
of 1937 and led to its widespread acceptance. Professor Ariens draws, from
the interrelationshipof these two constitutional events, telling lessons about
post-War legal thought and the evolution of constitutionalhistory.

"You could precisely quantify the influence of Shakespeare on T.S.
Eliot."
"But my thesis isn't about that," said Persse. "It's about the influence of T.S. Eliot on Shakespeare."
"That sounds rather Irish, if I may say so," said Dempsey, with a
loud guffaw. His little eyes looked anxiously around for support.
DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD 1

I.
Much of the future of American law depends on how the events of
1937 are interpreted.
DONALD H. GJERDINGEN, THE POLITICS OF THE
COASE THEOREM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
2
MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT
Influence runs against, as well as with, time. Our appreciation of
the constitutional crisis of 1937 depends as much on the events oc-

* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. Thanks
Smith for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft,
comments and suggestions on a later draft. Many thanks to my
for her excellent help, and to Dean Barbara Bader Aldave
research.
I DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD 6o (paperback ed. 1986).

to Don Gjerdingen and Steve
and to Rich Friedman for his
research assistant Connie Liem
for financially supporting this

2 Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern
Legal Thought, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 871, 917 (1986).
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curring after that crisis as on the events leading to it. The "lesson"
learned from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Court-Packing
Plan" and from the "switch in time that saved nine" depends on the
particular instructional manual from which one reads.
The manual I intend to present focuses on the importance of Felix
Frankfurter. In discussing the historical understanding of the Justices
of the Supreme Court, Professor John Henry Schlegel wrote, "there is
the problem of Felix Frankfurter."3 Justice Frankfurter remains a
problem if one wants to understand twentieth-century legal history.
His influence as a law professor and intellectual activist, his influence
as a member of the Court, and his influence directing the work of
other constitutional scholars must be taken into account when assessing constitutional histories. In this Article, I suggest that Justice Felix
Frankfurter tried to coordinate history to protect the integrity of the
Court as he saw it, and that he succeeded.
The Court's power to invalidate state and federal legislative action
has always been based on the assumption that the Court exercises
judgment rather than will. 4 Although the legislative and executive
branches were intended to be political branches and were allowed,
within their constitutional power, to impose their will in law, the
judiciary was to stand athwart the political process, to exercise judgment in deciding cases, and to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. Politics was about power and required a willingness to compromise; as a result, politicians were to be subject to regular elections.
Judging was about protecting the liberty of persons and institutions
from the abuses of political power and required adherence to (constitutional) principle; therefore, once appointed, federal judges were to
remain in office "during good Behaviour."5 These distinguishing characteristics necessitated the claims of both judicial independence from
politics and judicial nonintervention in politics.

3John H. Schlegel, The Line Between History and Casenote,

22

LAW & SOC'Y REv. 969,

974 (i988).

4See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 196I)
("[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment
....");
see also Court-PackingPlan, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 203, 204 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD HISTORY OF THE

SUPREME COURT] ("[The Court-Packing Plan] reinforced the American people's understanding

that law and politics should be separated, and that although the Supreme Court was not wholly
above politics, it must not be converted into a political institution.").
5U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Alexander Hamilton defended the life-tenure provision as
follows:

[A]s liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything
to fear from its union with either of the other departments ... and that as nothing can
contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality

may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and,
in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 4, at 466.
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The Court's authority to interpret the Constitution was thus linked
to the Court's separation from politics. For post-World War II constitutional scholars, the most widely known event suggesting that the
Court was engulfed in politics was the "switch" by Justice Owen
Roberts during the spring of 1937, a switch that many believed was
the result of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "court-packing"
plan. 6 By severing the link between FDR's plan and Justice Roberts's
actions in 1937, Felix Frankfurter protected the Court's position as
primary interpreter of the Constitution. Reestablishing the Court's
authority was again crucial during the last half of the r950s, when
the Court's legitimacy as an authoritative constitutional interpreter
was at risk as a result of its Brown decisions. 7 Understanding the
constitutional crisis of 1937 and its particular relevance to the challenge of Brown in the 195os requires another look at the machinations
of Felix Frankfurter. In this manual, Frankfurter plays two roles one as Supreme Court Justice, and a second as guardian of the Court's
virtue.
For Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court was a temple, a sacred
place. 8 It was sacred because the Court decided cases (and interpreted
the Constitution) according to the rule of law. The covenant between
the Court and "the people" required, the Court to decide cases based
on reason and judgment rather than on personal preference or will.
As long as the Court upheld its part of this covenant, it remained a
revered institution dutifully undertaking its arduous responsibilities.
If, however, politics were to intrude into the Court, this intrusion
would lead to the Court's "desecration." Politics could infect the Court
from without or from within, but no matter what the source, the
result would be the same. As both a devoted worshipper and one of
its high priests, Justice Frankfurter tended the Court's garden of law
from the wilderness of politics. From 1954 to 1959, Justice Frankfurter's challenge was particularly acute; the Court was saddled with
the heavy burden of proving that its decisions in Brown were the
result of an exercise of judgment rather than will, and Justice Frankfurter's version of the events of 1937 helped to ease that burden.
In 1937, the Supreme Court faced a crisis involving its authority
to interpret the Constitution. The crisis ended only after it appeared
that the wall separating law from politics had crumbled. That resolution caused Frankfurter to lash out privately at the intrusion of
6 See infra pp. 627-28.

See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregated public
schooling violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). On May 31, 1955,
the Court announced the desegregation of segregated public schools "with all deliberate speed."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 30 (1955).
8 See infra p. 667.
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politics into the Supreme Court. In a March 30, 1937, letter to FDR,
Frankfurter wrote: "And now, with the shift by Roberts, even a blind
man ought to see that the Court is in politics, and understand how
the Constitution is 'judicially' construed. It is a deep object lesson a lurid demonstration - of the relation of men to the 'meaning' of
the Constitution. "9

Nearly a generation later, Frankfurter, by then a Justice of the
Supreme Court, had a new tale to tell. In a memorial tribute to
Justice Owen J. Roberts published in the December i955 issue of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 10 Justice Frankfurter successfully sowed the seeds of a revisionist history of the "switch in time
that saved nine.""1 Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history permitted
defenders of the Supreme Court to claim that Justice Roberts had not
12
altered his stance in 1937 as a result of FDR's court-packing plan.
Frankfurter's new story presented Justice Roberts's abrupt shift in the
spring of 1937 as one based on constitutional principle, and certainly
not on politics. Consequently, the American people, and their public
officials, could continue to entrust the Court with the power of judicial
review, because the Court's independent assessment of the constitutionality of state and federal law was necessary to the proper functioning of the American democratic experiment.' 3
9 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937), in ROOSEVELT
AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, at 392 (Max Freedman ed., 1967)

[hereinafter ROOSEvELT AND FRANKFURTER].
10 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (i955).
11Professor Philip Bobbitt and Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis credit this phrase to
Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE 39 (I982); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM 1937-40, at 8i (1993). Neither
cites Powell's use of this phrase. At least three other variations exist. Joseph Alsop takes credit
for the phrase "a switch in time saves nine." JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE i68
DAYS 135 (1938). Leonard Baker credits Abe Fortas with the quip "the switch in time that
serves nine." LEONARD BAKER, BACK To BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT 174 (1967) (citing High Court Assailed at Labor Institute, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1937,
at ig). Professor Gerald Gunther and The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations

quote the phrase as "[tihe switch in time that saved the Nine." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (12th ed. i99 i ) [hereinafter GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION]; THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., i993). Neither
identifies the author of the quip.
12On February S, 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a bill to reorganize
the federal judiciary. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The 342d Press Conference (Feb. 5, 1937),
in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION
PREVAILS 1937, at 35, 49-50 (1941) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS].

Roosevelt's proposed legislation was attacked by its opponents as a "court-packing" plan.
13As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental
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Justice Frankfurter's new story took hold among a generation of
legal scholars deeply committed to the law/politics divide and came
at a time when the threat to that divide was particularly acute. For
those scholars, after the crisis of 1937, "the problems for all of us
became: How can we defend a judicial veto in areas where we thought
it helpful in American life - civil liberties area, personal freedom,
First Amendment - and at the same time condemn it in the areas
where we considered it unhelpful?"'14 These problems were made
more acute by the Brown decisions, decisions in which a "legal justification [was needed] for what [Justice Frankfurter] agreed was a
'congenial' political solution." 15
I suggest the following can be learned from this Article: first, Felix
Frankfurter had a major impact on the course of American law and
understanding that impact is necessary in order to comprehend twentieth-century legal history; second, Justice Frankfurter's revisionist
history of Justice Roberts's actions in 1937 was only incidentally a

law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, .. . the Constitution ought to be preferred to
the statute ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 4, at 467.
14Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 924 (0993) (quoting an
interview of Herbert Wechsler sometime between 1978 and 1982 (citations omitted)).
Is
Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1919 (199).
Part of the fissure between legal progressives in the late i95os involved the justification of
Brown. See infra pp. 669-74. Initially, most legal scholars defended the Court's decision in
Brown as a proper "legal" interpretation of the Constitution. After the criticisms of Brown by
Judge Learned Hand and, more importantly, Professor Herbert Wechsler in their successive
Holmes lectures, however, scholars have since grounded defenses of Brown on either the Court's
or the Constitution's "moral" authority rather than its "legal" authority. See MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 6 (1993) (stating that Brown
represents "an activist decision striking down legislative action, with what many believed was
questionable justification in conventional legal terms but with social and moral import that
found wide approval in the liberal community (and, of course, not only there)"); ALPHEUS T.
MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 178 (1962) ("[The Supreme Court's]
decisions, based on reason and authority, have a moral force far exceeding that of the purse or
sword."); see also Tushnet & Lezin, supra, at 1919 (asserting that Justice Frankfurter's difficulty
with Brown was that, "if Congress did not 'manifest' an intent to 'outlaw segregation,' where
could the Court find its authority to hold segregation unconstitutional?").
On Wechsler's lecture, one commentator has stated:
I have always found it more than slightly repellent that [Wechsler's lecture], which
depends for its entire intellectual enterprise on the proposition that the pursuit of human
equality is not a neutral principle of law, and hence is an insufficient basis for ordering
the end of de jure racial segregation of schools, is the second most frequently cited law
review article of all time.
Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1056 n.36
(1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-

196o: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)).
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defense of Justice Roberts - this history was primarily an effort to
protect the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution at a time
when Brown threatened to compromise that authority; and third, the
crisis of 1937 was a turning point in our legal history, but possibly
for reasons other than those suggested by Professors Ackerman 16 and
Gjerdingen. 1 7 The constitutional crisis of 1937 remains important less
because of what really happened and more because the subsequent
explanations and analyses of the crisis tell us much about our desire
to shape the past for use in the present. These differing stories of the
Supreme Court in 1937 also tell us something about the attractions
and dangers of our fascination with the rule of law.
After a brief summary of the events leading up to and culminating
in the constitutional crisis of 1937, I examine the reactions of scholars
to those events. The initial history of the crisis was that Justice
Roberts "switched" in response to FDR's court-packing plan. This
belief was predominant until the publication in early 1956 of Justice
Frankfurter's revisionist history of Roberts's actions. This revisionist
history, which claimed that Justice Roberts' votes were based on
principle, not politics, was accepted by most legal scholars. A crucial
reason that Justice Frankfurter presented his revisionist history, and
that most legal scholars accepted it, was the need to preserve the role
of the Court as a principled decisionmaker, a need that was particularly acute because of Brown, which raised the issue of the Court's
authority in a manner reminiscent of the crisis of a generation before.
II.
The story of the 1937 Court fight is a twice-told tale.
WALTER

F.

MuRPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT'

8

A.
Although in 1934 and early 1935 the Supreme Court alternately
pleased both friend and foe of the New Deal, 19 the Court set its course
16 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40, 47-50, 105-30 (1991)

[hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 6-22 (1984) (discussing the realist legacy of the New Deal). Professor Ackerman suggests that the events of 1937 encompass one of three instances of constitutional politics in America, a revolution that "ends in the constitutional triumph of the activist
welfare state." ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra, at 40.
17 See Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Searchfor a Modern
Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 381, 441-45, 460-73 (1986); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The
Future of Our Past: The Legal Mind and the Legacy of Classical Common-Law Thought, 68
IND. L.J. 743, 764-68 (1993); Gjerdingen, supra note 2, at 893--904, 917-33. Professor Gjerdingen believes that "the events of 1937 represent a change from an unqualified transactional
justice system to a distributive justice system." Id. at 875.
18 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 57 (I962).
19Compare Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 302, 316 (1935) (upholding the
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in firm opposition to the New Deal with a series of decisions in May
1935. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 20 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Roberts, held unconstitutional the
Railroad Retirement Act, which required railroads to create pension
plans for their employees. 21 Three weeks later, on May 27, 1935, a
day New Dealers would remember as "Black Monday," the Supreme
Court unanimously held unconstitutional two Acts of Congress and a
presidential executive order. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford2 2 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, struck down
the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act of 1934, concluding that the
Act deprived mortgagees of their property without due process of
law. 23 The Court next announced its decision in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States.24 In Humphrey's Executor, the Court held unconstitutional FDR's decision to fire William Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. 25 Finally, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 6 the "Sick Chicken" case, the
Court concluded that the National Industrial Recovery Act violated
the Commerce Clause, because the Act was an attempt by Congress
to regulate intrastate commerce. 27 The Court then recessed for the
summer. President Roosevelt responded initially by attacking the
Court, 28 but shortly thereafter he stopped speaking publicly about the
Court's decisions.
The Supreme Court's 1935 Term brought more confrontation.
Early in the Term, the Court held unconstitutional the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond Congress's spending power. 29 May,

repudiation by the administration of the contractual duty to repay debts in gold) with Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430-33 (i935) (declaring unconstitutional the "hot oil"
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933). The Court also upheld several state
statutes that regulated economic matters. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 53839 (1934) (allowing New York to fix the price of milk); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (I934) (rejecting a Contracts Clause challenge to a Minnesota law that
temporarily halted mortgage foreclosures).
20 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
21 See id. at 374.
22 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
23See id. at 6o1-02.
24 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
25 See id. at 632.
26 295 U.S. 495 (i935).
27See id. at 55o-51.
28 This was FDR's famous "horse-and-buggy" press conference of May 31, 1935. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The 2o9th Press Conference (May 31, 1935), in 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES 1935, at 221 (1938)

[here-

inafter PUBLIC PAPERS: THE COURT DISAPPROVES] ("We have been relegated to the horse-andbuggy definition of interstate commerce.").
29 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1936). Shortly thereafter, however, in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), the Court upheld the constitution-
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however, was once again the cruelest month for FDR. In Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,30 five members of the Court held unconstitutional
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which set minimum
prices for the sale of coal, gave employees a right to bargain collectively, and created a structure to implement area-wide wage and hour
terms. 31 One week later, the Court, in Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo,3 2 held unconstitutional New York's minimum wage statute,
relying in part on precedent. 33 Joining the "Four Horsemen"3 4 (Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter) in the majority was Justice Roberts. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo dissented. 35 Morehead involved a state law,
not New Deal legislation. However, several years earlier, FDR had
recommended that a number of governors consider and adopt a minimum wage law based on the New York statute. 36 The Court's
Morehead decision thus constitutionally blocked any such action.
B.
A month after the opening of the Court's 1936 Term, Roosevelt
was reelected, winning 523 electoral votes to Alf Landon's 8, and
receiving over sixty percent of the popular vote. 3 7 On February 5,
1937, shortly after reinauguration, Roosevelt announced his proposed
ality of the Tennessee Valley Authority, see id. at 330. Justice Roberts joined Justice Brandeis's
concurring opinion. See id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
30 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
31 See id. at 315-17. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Hughes concurred in holding the
labor provisions unconstitutional and dissented with respect to the minimum price provisions.
See id. at 317 (separate opinion of Hughes, C.J.). Justice Cardozo's dissent was joined by
Justices Brandeis and Stone. See id. at 324 (Cardozo, J. dissenting in Nos. 636, 649 and 65o,
and concurring in the result in No. 65i).
32 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
3 See id. at 617-18. The Court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923),
which struck down the District of Columbia's minimum wage law as an unconstitutional
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 561-62.
34 See Four Horsemen, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 4, at 309
(noting, in reference to the four Justices consistently opposed to New Deal legislation, that they
"evoked the legendary Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse").
35 See Morehead, 298 U.S. at 618 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); id. at 631 (Stone, J., dissenting).
36 See Telegram from Franklin D. Roosevelt to 13 State Governors (Apr. 12, 1933), in 2
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.

ROOSEVELT: THE YEAR OF CRISIS

1933, at 133 (1938) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS: THE YEAR OF CRISIS]. The state of New York

undertook the effort to create minimum wage legislation that would withstand a constitutional
attack during FDR's term as governor, and the legislation passed in March 1933. See JOSEPH
P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS 47-53 (1988). It was written as a model minimum wage
statute for the National Consumers League by Benjamin Cohen, with the editorial guidance of
then-Professor Frankfurter. See id. at 52.
37 Roosevelt garnered 27,752,869 votes to Landon's 16,674,665 votes. All other candidates
received a total of 1,2oo,982 votes. See 2 THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 384 (Carl N. Degler ed., 4 th ed. 1979).
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legislation to reorganize the federal judiciary. 38 Part of this plan was
a proposal to nominate to any federal court one additional judge for
each sitting judge over the age of seventy. The President's proposal,
ostensibly, was to reduce the overloaded docket of the Supreme
Court. 3 9 Six members of the Supreme Court were over seventy, and

not surprisingly, the plan gave the President the opportunity to nominate a maximum of six additional Justices to the Supreme Court.
The Senate finally voted down FDR's amended legislation on July
22, 1937.40 In the interim, President Roosevelt signed a bill guaranteeing retired Justices a pension that could not be decreased; Senator
Burton Wheeler, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, managed to arrange the signing of a letter by Chief Justice Hughes, to
which Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter assented, declaring that
the Court was up to date in its work; Justice Van Devanter resigned
on May i8, i937; on the same day, the Senate Judiciary Committee
voted io-8 to report to the Senate that such a bill should "never again
be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America;" 41 Vice-President John Nance Garner left Washington for Texas
while Congress was in session for the first time in over thirty years
of governmental service; and in June, Joe Robinson of Arkansas Senate majority leader, chief congressional proponent of FDR's plan,
and heir apparent to Van Devanter's vacated seat - died of a heart
attack during the fight for passage of an amended court reorganization
42
plan.
During this period, two other events stood out. The events were
a pair of decisions by the Supreme Court, both decided by a vote of
5-4. On March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,43 the
Court held constitutional the state of Washington's minimum wage
act. 44 Two weeks later, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 45
the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act. 4 6
38 See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 35, 45-50. The court reorganization plan was developed
by Attorney General Homer Cummings, who met secretly with FDR. The origins of FDR's
court reorganization plan have been masterfully detailed in William E. Leuchtenburg, The

Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"Plan, x966 Sup. CT. REv. 347.
39 See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 35-44.
40 See William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 687-89.
41 Id. at 675 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., ist Sess. I, 23 (1937)).
42 See id. at 674, 685.
4' 300 U.S. 379 (I937).
44See id. at 399-400.
4 3oi U.S. 1 (i937).
46 See id. at 30. A third event, another decision by the Court, is also noteworthy. On May
24, 1937, the Court - again by a vote of 5-4, again with Justice Roberts silently in the majority
upheld the Social Security Act in the Social Security Cases. See Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640-45 (i937); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 30 U.S. 548, 583, 585 (i937).
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C.
The opinion in West Coast Hotel was read from the bench by
Chief Justice Hughes. Only ten months before, a majority of the
Court had held in Morehead that state minimum wage acts violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Because the
composition of the Court remained the same, these conflicting decisions were possible only because Justice Roberts concluded that Washington's minimum wage law, unlike New York's, was constitutional.
Two weeks later, the Court determined in Jones & Laughlin Steel
that Congress acted pursuant to its constitutionally granted power to
regulate commerce among the several states by regulating the terms
and conditions of employment of manufacturing employees. 48 This
49
decision seemed implicitly to overrule Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
which was decided less than one year earlier. The Court, again per
Chief Justice Hughes, largely ignored Carter, neither distinguishing
nor overruling its interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Justice
Roberts was again the only member of the Court to join fully with
the majority in both Carter and Jones & Laughlin Steel. In neither
West Coast Hotel nor Jones & Laughlin Steel did Justice Roberts
write an opinion explaining the abrupt shift in his voting posture.
Ill.
And now, with the shift by Roberts, even a blind man ought to see
that the Court is in politics, and understand how the Constitution is
"judicially" construed. It is a deep object lesson - a lurid demonstration - of the relation of men to the "meaning" of the Constitution.
FELIX FRANKFURTER TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT,
MARCH 30, I93750

Frankfurter's private reaction (publicly he remained silent, as he
had about FDR's plan) to the Court's decisions was immediate and
unsparing. In addition to his letter to FDR written the day after West
Coast Hotel was decided, Frankfurter wrote to Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone: "Roberts' somersault [is] incapable of being attributed to a
single factor relevant to the professed judicial process. Everything

The decisions in the Social Security Cases, broadly interpreting Congress's general welfare
power, were clearly a departure from the 1936 decision of United States v. Butler. See United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i, 68 (1936) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (holding unconstitutional a federal
statute subsidizing farmers to reduce their acreage and crops with funds exacted through a tax
on processors of agricultural commodities).
47
48
49
50

See supra p. 627.
See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 30-31.
298 U.S. 238 (1936).

Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 392.
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that he now subscribes to he rejected not only on June first last, but
as late as October twelfth when New York's petition for a rehearing
was denied .... x51
Two days later, replying to Justice Brandeis's
letter, which speculated that "[o]verruling Adkins' Case must give you
some satisfaction,"5 2 Frankfurter responded, "[i]t is characteristically
kind of you to think of the aspects of the Washington minimum wage
case that would give me some satisfaction, but, unhappily, it is one
of life's bitter-sweets and the bitter far outweighs the sweet."5 3 A day
after Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided, Frankfurter wrote to
Charles Wyzanski that "[t]o me it is all painful beyond words, the
poignant grief of one whose life has been dedicated to faith in the
disinterestedness of a tribunal and its freedom from responsiveness to
the most obvious immediacies of politics .. "54
A.
There were two immediate chronicles of the constitutional crisis
of 1937: The 168 Days by Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, 55 and
The Supreme Court Crisis by Merlo Pusey.5 6 Alsop and Catledge's
book, published in 1938, is notable for its sympathy toward Roosevelt's court-reorganization legislation. The moral of their book is that,
although the proposed legislation may have been defeated, "A Switch
in Time Saves Nine."5 7 For Alsop and Catledge, the minimum wage
and Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions of the Supreme Court resulted
less from the President's court-packing plan than from the Court's
bending to the political will of a newly and resoundingly reelected
8
President.5
Pusey's work, on the other hand, which was supported by the
American Bar Association and distributed to thousands of lawyers, is
a bill of complaints against President Roosevelt. Pusey argues that
an independent judiciary is the only institution that can protect the
United States from a "dictatorial regime," 5 9 and that the court-packing

51 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 30, 1937), in LIVA BAKER, FELIX
FRANKFURTER i89-9o (1969).
52 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 29, 1937), in "HALF BROTHER,
HALF SON": THE LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 594 (Melvin I.
Urofsky & David IV. Levy eds., iggi) [hereinafter HALF BROTHER, HALF SON].
S3 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis D. Brandeis, (Mar. 31, 1937), in HALF BROTHER,
HALF SON, supra note 52, at 594 n.i.
54MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 272
(1982) (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski (Apr. 13, 1937)).
$5 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note i i.

56 MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS (1937).
57 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note ii, at 135.
5sSee id. at 20-2I, 135-40.
59 PUSEY, supra note 56, at 48.
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plan was an attack on the Court's independence. 60 Because his work
was published as an "instant history" in June 1937, however, Pusey
was unable to construct a legal defense of the Supreme Court's West
Coast Hotel and Jones and Laughlin Steel decisions. Instead, Pusey
61
was left parroting the reasoning of Chief Justice Hughes's opinions.
Pusey concluded, with respect to the decision in West Coast Hotel,
"[i]t is difficult to believe that their decision would have been different
if the President had not asked power to pack the Court. '62 Pusey
apparently was at a loss to explain the votes of Justice Roberts and
63
Chief Justice Hughes in favor of the National Labor Relations Act.
"Were [Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts] intimidated by the
Administration's assault upon the Court? Did they adjust their convictions in the hope of saving the Court from the ignominy of being
packed? These questions doubtless will never be answered." 6 4 One
answer, however, was that to ask these questions reinforced the necessity of an independent judiciary. Pusey was unwilling to accept
the conclusion that politics affected the Court's decisions, but he was
nevertheless unable to provide constitutionally based reasons for the
Court's change of mind.
B.
Notwithstanding Pusey's opinions, for more than a decade and a
half, most studies of the constitutional crisis of 1937 concluded that
politics, in the form of FDR's reelection and his Court reorganization
plan, caused the Court to alter its voting pattern. The historians
Charles and Mary Beard ironically noted that the Court's decisions in
West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel "[t]o mere laymen . ..
looked like a reversal of opinion." 65 Before taking a seat on the
Supreme Court, Robert H. Jackson authored The Struggle for Judicial

60 See id. at 44-46.
61 Pusey would later become Hughes's biographer. See MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EvANS
HUGHES (2 vols. 1951).

62 PUSEY, supra note 56, at 51. Pusey based this conclusion solely on Hughes's statement
that, unlike counsel for Elsie Parrish in West Coast Hotel, counsel for New York in Morehead
asked only that the Court distinguish Morehead from Adkins rather than reconsider Adkins.
See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 (1937); PUSEY, supra note 56, at 49. This

was disingenuous on Chief Justice Hughes's part, because counsel for New York in Morehead
had asked for reconsideration of Adkins in its petition for certiorari, and counsel for Parrish
had largely urged the Court to distinguish rather than overrule both Adkins and Morehead.
See Appellee's Brief on the Law at 3-4, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 91 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS].

63 See PUSEY, supra note 56, at 52-53.
64Id. at 53.
65 I CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 359 (I939).
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Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics,66 an
examination of the crisis of 1937. He observed that "[the Justices of
the Supreme Court] confessed legal error and saved themselves from
political humiliation. They subdued the rebellion against their constitutional dogma by joining it."6 7 Max Lerner was slightly more
equivocal. He explained in 1942 that "[t]here are some who maintain
that Justices Hughes and Roberts had already made up their minds
to retreat before the President announced his Court plan. We shall
never know for certain what went on between the Justices during the
68
Saturday sessions at which they discussed their coming decisions."
In the same year, Professor Benjamin F. Wright assayed the conclusion that the court-packing plan caused the "switch in time. 69 The
great political scientist Edward S. Corwin also concluded that politics
rather than law had influenced the Court's West Coast Hotel and
Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions. 70 However, like Alsop and Catledge, Corwin also believed that Roosevelt's reelection was more
responsible for the change of heart by Justices Hughes and Roberts
than Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan. 71 Carl Swisher concluded, "the feeling of the public, and probably of the bar as well,
was that Justice Roberts had deemed it expedient to change his position because of the movement to reorganize the Court. ' 72 Robert
Stern wrote in the Harvard Law Review that the Court's sudden
reversal was not attributable "to anything inherent in the cases themselves," 73 and argued that the consensus was that Justice Roberts and
Chief Justice Hughes altered their votes to save the "independent"
judiciary from legislative restructuring. 74
In 1948, C. Herman Pritchett, amazed by the Court's West Coast
Hotel decision, declared that "the Court itself began to prove the truth
of Mr. Dooley's conclusion that that estimable body generally, if be-

66 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A

CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS at xviii (1941). Jackson was FDR's Attorney General in
194o and i94i before his appointment to the Supreme Court, and in 1937, as Solicitor General,
he ardently supported FDR's court-packing plan.
67 Id. at vi.
68 Max Lerner, The Great Constitutional War, i8 VA. Q. REV. 530, 540 (i942).
69 See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202 &
n.3 (1942).

70 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 73 (1941).
71 See id.
72 CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 946 (1943); see also CARL
B. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 225-27 (1946)

(describing the assessment of the Court's "switch in time" as a reaction to FDR's court-reorganization plan).
73 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, z933-46, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 645, 681 (1946).
74See id. at 682.
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latedly, 'follows th' illiction returns.' 7 5 Four years later, the constitutional historian and judicial biographer Alpheus T. Mason also
concluded that politics had led to the reversal. 76 In 1953, Harvardeducated Australian lawyer and legal scholar Edward McWhinney
wrote that Justice Roberts had "switch[ed]" in i937.77 Yet even as
the political explanation of the Court's actions in 1937 became the
standardized version of events, Felix Frankfurter privately laid the
groundwork for a wholly different account of those events, 78 an account more in keeping with the post-World War II legal academy's
faith in the principled, disinterested judge.
Against the predominant view, Pusey largely maintained a lonely
vigil. 79 As the hand-picked 80 biographer of Chief Justice Hughes, he

75C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES, 1937-1947, at 8-9 (1948).

76 See Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 6i YALE L.J. 791,
8x6 (1952); see also ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 627 (1946) (arguing
that concern over proposals for reform of the federal judiciary prompted the Court to rule in
favor of the administration in its 1937 decisions).
77 Edward McWhinney, Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion-Wiiting in FinalAppellate Tribunals, 31 CANADIAN B. REV. 595, 613 (1953).
78 After McWhinney's article was published, Justice Frankfurter wrote to Professor Paul
Freund of the Harvard Law School, asking "Am I wrong in having the impression that Edward
McWhinney is something of a protege of yours?" Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul
A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (Oct. i8,1953), microformed on Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Harvard Law School Library, at Part III, Reel 15 (Univ. Publications of Am., Inc.)
[hereinafter Harvard Frankfurter Papers]; Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, at
Container 56 (Library of Congress Manuscript Div.) [hereinafter Library of Congress Frankfurter
Papers]. In this letter, as in the Roberts memorandum, Frankfurter only discusses the "switch"
regarding the minimum wage cases. Frankfurter then first privately expressed to Freund part
of the claim that he would make publicly less than three years later: "The fact is that Roberts
did not switch. He was prepared in Tipaldo to make a majority overruling Adkins. He was
not prepared to distinguish Adkins. Because there was no majority for overruling Adkins he
was in the majority in the Morehead case on the basis of which Morehead was decided." Id.
at I. Frankfurter then quoted Hughes' remark in West Coast Hotel that the issue in the
Morehead case was whether to distinguish rather than overrule Adkins. See id.
For a discussion of Freund's particular influence as a constitutional scholar, see pp. 659-62
below.
79Pusey was joined in part only by Samuel Hendel and Charles Curtis. Hendel's book was
published shortly before Pusey's in I95i; Curtis's book was published in 1947. See CHARLES
P. CURTIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 159, 174 (1947) (concluding that Justice Roberts
"quite simply reverted to his former attitude in the Nebbia case three years before," but also
concluding that some "shift" in Justice Roberts's positions took place in the minimum wage,
Jones & Laughlin Steel, and Social Security Cases); SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 252-53, , 264-65 (195) (conceding that in West Coast Hotel
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts switched in part to defeat the court-packing plan, but
arguing that Hughes's decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel was not a shift in position).
so Alpheus T. Mason was critical of Pusey's closeness to his biographical subject. See
Alpheus T. Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REv.
I, i8-I9 (1952) ("Mr. Hughes repudiated autobiography as smacking of 'apologia'; he distrusted
independent research as running the risk of 'misrepresentation.' Conscious of both these pitfalls,
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argued that the Court had not switched in response to Roosevelt's
plan. Regarding West Coast Hotel, Pusey quoted Hughes's Biographical Notes: "The President's proposal had not the slightest effect on
our decision." 8 1 The questions Pusey found unanswerable in I937
were answered in 1951. To deflect the charge that Justice Roberts
"switched" his vote in the Jones & Laughlin Steel case, Pusey again
quoted the Biographical Notes: "[A]s to Justice Roberts, I feel that I
am able to say with definiteness that his view in favor of [the Jones
& Laughlin Steel decision] would have been the same if the President's
bill had never been proposed. The Court acted with complete independence."8 2 Because there was nothing other than Chief Justice
Hughes's bald assertions8 3 to support the claim that the Court had
not reacted to Roosevelt's plan, Pusey was alone in his vigil.
This changed with the publication of Justice Felix Frankfurter's
tribute to the late Justice Owen Roberts.

IV.
Frankfurter when the Diaries resume in
not been recovered) ....
JOSEPH

P.

1943

(the Diary for 1937 has

LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER

84

he chose his biographer and worked closely with him over a period of several years."). When
Mason published his biography of Harlan Fiske Stone, Pusey criticized Mason's lack of "objectivity" in assessing the Hughes Court. See Merlo J. Pusey, A Great Man of the Law Portrayed:
In a New Life of Chief Justice Stone a Chapter of American History Unrolls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. I, 1956, § 7, at I (reviewing ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF
THE LAW (1956)).

81 2 PUSEY, supra note 6i, at 757 (quoting Charles E. Hughes, Biographical Notes, ch.
XXIII, at 31); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 312 (David J.

Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES].
Chief Justice Hughes's Biographical Notes were published in 1973. See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES OF HUGHES, supra.
82 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 81, at 313; 2 PUSEY, supra note 61,

at 768 (quoting Charles E. Hughes, Biographical Notes, ch. XXIII, at 33).
83 In a 1983 article, Pusey wrote that he had "confidential[ly]" interviewed Justice Roberts
on May 31, 1946, at which time Justice Roberts convinced him that "his chief objective at that
time had been to avoid making a decision on the vital issue of state minimum-wage legislation
against the background of New York's disingenuous arguments." Merlo J. Pusey, Justice
Roberts' z937 Turnaround, 1983 Y.B. SUP. Cr. HIST. SOC'Y 102, xo6. Probably because the
interview was confidential, Pusey did not cite this interview in his Hughes biography, but it
may be considered additional, albeit biased, evidence for his conclusions. Pusey apparently did
not ask Roberts to explain his votes in Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social Security Cases.
In the same article, Pusey also noted that Justice Roberts's "initial, semifacetious reply" to
Pusey's question about a shift was: "Who knows what causes a judge to decide as he does?
Maybe the breakfast he had has something to do with it." Id.
84 JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 141 (1975).
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In the December 195585 issue of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Justice Frankfurter wrote a seven-page tribute to his
former colleague, Justice Roberts. 8 6 Frankfurter's tribute had two

purposes: first, to honor a former colleague, and second, to tell "[tlhe
truth about the so-called 'switch' of Roberts in connection with the
Minimum Wage cases .... ,,87 Frankfurter accomplished his first
purpose in little more than two pages; the remainder of the tribute
consisted of his attempt to resolve the second issue.

A.
"It is one of the most ludicrous illustrations of the power of lazy
repetition of uncritical talk that a judge with the character of Roberts

should have attributed to him a change of judicial views out of
88
deference to political considerations," began Frankfurter's defense.

Frankfurter took special offense when prominent politicians and academic scholars repeatedly claimed

that Justice Roberts's votes

changed as a result of Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan. This
charge was false, and Frankfurter was going to refute it with "indisputable facts."8 9 What were these indisputable facts?
Frankfurter made three arguments to refute this charge. First,
timing was everything. To understand Justice Roberts's votes, a crit-

85 The correspondence between Justice Frankfurter and the editors of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review indicates that the issue was actually published in late January or
early February of 1956. See Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container
181.
86See Frankfurter, supra note xo. Roberts, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, was a prominent lawyer in Philadelphia. See Erwin R. Griswold, Owen J. Roberts
as a Judge, io4 U. PA. L. REv. 332, 332-33 (1955). He gained national attention for his work
as special counsel investigating the Teapot Dome scandal. See id. In 1930, President Hoover
appointed him to the Court. After resigning from the Court at age seventy in 1945, Roberts
returned to private practice and a life as a gentleman farmer. He became Dean of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School in 1948. See id. at 349. The sole published biography of Roberts
is CHARLES A. LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY (1971).
Justice Roberts died on May 17, 1955, a year to the day after Brown was decided, and two
weeks before the remedy in Brown was handed down. In a 1944 letter, Roberts made Frankfurter his "judicial executor." See Letter from Justice Owen J. Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 12, 1944), microforrned on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part Im,
Reel 3. Roberts's purpose in making Frankfurter his judicial executor was apparently to halt
any "joint expression" from the Court and any "memorial ceremony." It does not appear to
have been Frankfurter's "duty" to protect Roberts's reputation as a jurist after Roberts's death,
and there is no mention in this letter of any explanation by Roberts of his actions in 1937.
87 Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314.
89 Id. at 313. In the next sentence, Frankfurter noted an unnamed Senator's allusion to "the
famous switch of Mr. Justice Roberts." Id. Frankfurter was referring to Senator Paul Douglas,
whose statement appeared in the April 13, 1955 issue of the Congressional Record. See Clipping
of April 13, 1955 Congressional Record (84th Cong., ist Sess., at 363), microformed on Harvard
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3.
89Frankfurter, supra note io, at 313.
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ical investigator needed to look at the interstices of the United States
Reports. On November 23, 1936, two and one-half months before
Roosevelt's Court plan was publicly announced, an evenly divided
Supreme Court affirmed a New York Court of Appeals decision that
had upheld the constitutionality of the New York Unemployment
Insurance Law. 90 Because Justice Stone was ill and thus absent from
the bench at that time, the fourth vote for to sustain the act must
have come from Justice Roberts. 9 1 Because "[t]he constitutional outlook represented by [that case] would reflect the attitude of a Justice
towards the issues involved in the Adkins case, '92 Justice Roberts's
vote on this date foreshadowed his vote in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. Looking only at the United States Reports, therefore, it was
apparent to any scholar of the Court that Justice Roberts's decision
in West Coast Hotel was not influenced by Roosevelt's court-reorganization legislation. 93

90 See W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515, 515 (1936) (per curiam).
91 See Frankfurter, supra note Io, at 316.
92 Id.
93 The timing argument was unavailable with respect to Jones & Laughlin Steel and the
Social Security Cases, because the votes in those cases took place after FDR's announcement
of his Court reorganization plan. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937),
was argued on February io-xi, 1937; the Social Security Cases, Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 549 (1937); and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (x937), were argued on
April 8-9 and May 5 of that year.
A similar timing argument regarding West Coast Hotel was made by then-Dean of Harvard
Law School, Erwin Griswold, in his tribute to Roberts in the same issue of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 341-42. Dean Griswold wrote:
The story is written quite clearly in the public record, but there has been much misunderstanding about it, and it is widely said that Roberts, frightened by the President's
Court-packing plan, flopped over from a vote against minimum wage legislation in 1936
to one in favor of such statutes in 1937. No one could say this with any understanding
of Roberts.
Id. at 340.
Griswold's tribute had its own effect. In a i99i review of Griswold's memoirs, the estimable
federal courts scholar Charles Alan Wright wrote:
The article [Griswold's tribute to Roberts] is completely convincing that neither the Courtpacking plan nor the outcome of the 1936 election played a part in Roberts's vote to
strike down a New York minimum wage statute in Morehead . . . and to uphold a
Washington statute in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish ....
Charles A. Wright, "A Man May Live Greatly in the Law", 70 TEX. L. REV. 505, 5x6 n.78
(i99I) (citations omitted) (reviewing ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CoRNE: THE
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY LAWYER (1992)).

For his part, Dean Griswold's "public record" is the declaration that Justice Roberts voted
with the majority in Morehead because counsel for New York did not request overruling Adkins,
and the statutes were not distinguishable. Although not cited by Griswold, Pusey had previously
made this assertion publicly in his biography of Hughes. See 2 PUSEY, supra note 61, at 700oi. Pusey's biography is, however, cited by Griswold elsewhere in his tribute. See Griswold,
supra note 86, at 343. In response to my request, Dean Griswold wrote that he does not recall
ever speaking to Justice Roberts about his votes in Morehead and West Coast Hotel and that a
thorough knowledge of Justice Roberts and the beginning of the Morehead opinion (which
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Second, Frankfurter cited Justice Roberts's majority opinion in the

1934 case of Nebbia v. New York 94 as evidence that Justice Roberts

opposed the "constitutional philosophy" of the four dissenters in West
Coast Hotel.95 In Frankfurter's view, Justice Roberts's opinion in
Nebbia "undermined the foundations of Adkins" 96 and allowed Chief
Justice Hughes to rely "heavily" on Nebbia in writing the majority's
opinion in West Coast Hotel.97 Frankfurter suggests that the reader
can deduce the outcome in West Coast Hotel from Nebbia's logic;
under this reasoning, Justice Roberts's Nebbia opinion refutes any
notion that Justice Roberts "switched" in West Coast Hotel.
Frankfurter's final and most important argument for Justice Roberts's principled decisionmaking, however, was found in. a memorandum given to Frankfurter by Roberts, and made public for the first
time in the tribute. 98 Roberts prepared this memorandum at Frankinsisted that the petition for certiorari asked to distinguish Adkins, not assess its constitutionality)
makes it obvious that this was the price of Justice Roberts's vote. See Letter from Erwin N.
Griswold, former Dean, Harvard Law School, to Michael Ariens, Professor (Mar. io, 1993) (on
file at the Harvard Law School Library). But the majority's opinion in Morehead went well
beyond the confines of its first sentence, and nothing in the public record indicates that Justice
Roberts disagreed with any part of the Morehead opinion. Additionally, New York counsel did
request that the Court consider overruling Adkins. See infra note io5. With all deference, I
am not convinced by Dean Griswold's explanation of Justice Roberts's views, especially because
Griswold concludes his letter to me by citing Frankfurter's tribute as further evidence. See
Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Michael Ariens, supra.
The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, however, made special mention
of the fact that Griswold's tribute exonerating Roberts was written without knowledge of the
Frankfurter tribute. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 340 n.*. However, Frankfurter may have
been aware of Griswold's tribute before he penned his own tribute to Roberts. A November
28, 1955 letter from Curtis Reitz to Frankfurter notes that all but Frankfurter's "introductcry
remarks and Mr. Justice Roberts' own memorandum" had been received and edited for publication. The letter then goes on to state, "I am somewhat apprehensive that further editing may
be required in order to avoid any unintentional impression that may arise from Dean Griswold's
treatment of the criticism that Roberts 'switched' votes under political pressure." Letter from
Curtis R. Reitz, Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, to Justice Felix Frankfurter
(Nov. 28, 1955), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at
Container i8i. Frankfurter responded on November 30, 1955, by writing, "Your reference to
Dean Griswold's treatment of the 'switching' judge naturally interests me. Do you suppose you
could let me see what Dean Griswold has written? It might save you further editing." Letter
from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Curtis R. Reitz, Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (Nov. 30, 1955), microforted on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note
78, at Container I81. I have been unable to locate any response to this request in the Frankfurter
Papers.
94 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Because this case was decided by a vote of 5-4, Justice Roberts's
affirmative vote was decisive.
95 See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 316-17.
96 Id. at 317.

97 See id.
98 See id. at 314 n.*. In his interview with Merlo Pusey on May 31, 1946, Justice Roberts
apparently made no mention of having given Justice Frankfurter six months previously any
memorandum concerning his decision in West Coast Hotel. See Pusey, supra note 83, at
io6-07.
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furter's request, which, according to Frankfurter, "took not a little
persuasion." 9 9 Frankfurter stated that Roberts gave him the memorandum on November 9, 1945, after Roberts had resigned from the
Court.' 0 0 For Frankfurter, Roberts's memorandum confirmed the "independent" timing defense of Roberts's vote in West Coast Hotel.
Roberts's memorandum gave the following account: during the week
of October 5, 1936, Justice Roberts voted to grant certiorari in West
Coast Hotel, and shortly after the case was argued on December 16
and I7, 1936, Justice Roberts voted to affirm the lower court's decision
and uphold the constitutionality of Washington's minimum wage stat-

ute. As Justice Stone was ill and not voting, the Court held over the
case until his return, because a decision by an evenly divided Court

was thought an "unfortunate outcome." 10 1 When the case was again

taken up on February 6, 1937, Justice Stone's vote to affirm broke
the tie, and the opinion was then assigned by Chief Justice Hughes
to himself. It was announced on March 29, 1937.102

One difficulty with both the timing and the Nebbia defenses of
Justice Roberts's "switch" is that neither sufficiently explains why

Justice Roberts voted to hold a state minimum wage statute unconstitutional in Morehead in May 1936 and voted to hold a nearly

identical statute constitutional ten months later in West Coast Hotel.
The statements in Roberts's memorandum have become the standard
revised version of the reasons "synthesizing" the differing decisions:
because counsel for the state of New York in Morehead asked only

that the Court distinguish 0 3 the Adkins 10 4 precedent, and not overrule
it, Justice Roberts felt compelled to follow Adkins. Simply put, it
was the fault of timid and disingenuous counsel for the state of New
York, who failed to urge the overruling of Adkins. l0 5 As the memo-

99 Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314.
100 See id. 'at 314 n.*.
101 Id. at 315.
102 See id. at 314-15.
103 Ironically, it was Frankfurter and Ben Cohen who strongly urged that the statute at issue
in Morehead be drafted in such a way that it would be distinguishable from the Adkins
precedent. See LASH, supra note 36, at 15-6, 47-50.
104 Adkins held that a District of Columbia law that mandated a minimum wage violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 559 (1923). Arguing on behalf of the constitutionality of the law was then-Professor Felix
Frankfurter. Justice Brandeis did not participate in the decision because his daughter Elizabeth
was the secretary of the District of Columbia wage board. See LASH, supra note 36, at 38.
105 Merlo Pusey made this argument in 1951 in his biography of Charles Evans Hughes.
Without citing any source, Pusey wrote: "The time was ripe for a bold assault upon Adkins v.
Children's Hospital. But counsel for New York missed his opportunity. Meekly accepting the
Adkins ruling, he asked the court only to differentiate the two statutes. Roberts thought that
reasoning was disingenuous and voted with the conservatives." 2 PUSEY, supra note 6z, at 7o1;
see also Pusey, supra note 83, at io6 (stating that Roberts convinced him that "his chief objective
at that time had been to avoid making a decision on the vital issue of state minimum-wage
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randum noted, Justice Roberts had told his brethren, when the petition for certiorari in Morehead was discussed in conference, that he
intended to follow precedent because New York did not urge overruling in Adkins.
When the Court met in October 1936 to consider whether to grant
certiorari to cases filed with the Court over the summer, the Roberts
memorandum states that four members of the majority in Morehead
"voted to dismiss the appeal in the Parrish case." 10 6 The memorandum also states that Roberts voted to note probable jurisdiction,
10 7 Because "the
although "I am not sure that I gave my reason."
authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court was asked
to reconsider and overrule it," Roberts wrote, "for the first time, I
was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the
Adkins case." 10 8 Although Roberts confessed error in not separately
legislation against the background of New York's disingenuous arguments"). Frankfurter was
aware of the argument that New York counsel was disingenuous, because he reviewed the
Hughes biography for the New York Times and, as his papers indicate, he underlined in his
own review copy the second sentence quoted above. See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra
note 78, at Part III, Reel 39.
But in 1938, Frankfurter destroyed this argument:
An examination of the contents of the petition for certiorariaffords a conclusive answer
to the views of the majority. It shows that the petitioner took the broad position that
the statute was constitutional irrespective of anything decided in the Adkins case. And
such statements as the sixth reason relied upon for the allowance of the writ, that "The
circumstances prevailing under which the New York law was enacted call for a reconsideration of the Adkins case in light of the New York Act and conditions deemed to be
remedied thereby," raised the argumentative claim that the Adkins case should no longer
be followed, expressed as euphemistically as the tactful language of advocacy would
naturally convey it.
Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the OctoberTerms,
z935 and x936, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 634 n.127 (1938). Fisher later became Justice Frankfurter's first Supreme Court law clerk.
106 Frankfurter, supra note to, at 315.
107 Id.
108 Id. Roberts's claim seems suspect, however, even at first blush. In his 1938 article,
Frankfurter himself suggested that these "technical barriers of appellate practice" to considering
the constitutionality of state minimum wage acts in Morehead were inapposite. With respect to
Justice Roberts, left unnamed in this article, Frankfurter wrote:
That a Justice who found technical barriers of appellate practice against even considering
whether the specific objections to minimum wage legislation made by the Adkins case
had been met by a later statute should, within less than a year, make the majority
necessary for overruling the Adkins case, cannot have many parallels in the history of
the Supreme Court. But, within less than a year, the Adkins case was overruled.
Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 1o5, at 635-36.
Furthermore, Professor Richard Friedman informed me that, as of October 12, 1936, the
Court possessed only the jurisdictional statement of West Coast Hotel, the petitioner. When the
petition was granted, no papers from either Parrish's counsel or the State of Washington
requesting that Adkins or Morehead be overruled were before the Court. See Amended Statement as to Jurisdiction at 13-14, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 62, at 9o-9i. Interestingly, the memorandum itself seems to
acknowledge that Justice Roberts could not have known that the authority of Adkins was being
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concurring the previous year in the Morehead case,10 9 he concluded
that "[t]hese facts make it evident that no action taken by the President
in the interim had any causal relation to my action in the Parrish
0
case.""l
And there you have it.
B.
The problem, of course, is that Justice Frankfurter does not deliver
the promised "indisputable facts," whether by looking at the interstices
of the United States Reports, by citing Roberts's opinion in Nebbia,
or by making public Roberts's memorandum. Viewed critically,1 1 '
Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history raises more questions than it
answers. These facts do not lead to the conclusion that in the spring

assailed when he voted to hear the case. See Frankfurter, supra note io,at 315 ("During the
conferences [from October 5, 1937 to October io, 1937] the jurisdictional statement in the
Parrish case was considered . .
").
109 See Frankfurter, supra note io,at 314-15. Justice Roberts's memorandum suggests that
his decision to make a majority in Morehead, and thus hold the New York law unconstitutional,
was based completely on precedent. In response to a circulated dissent, Justice Butler's revised
draft of the majority opinion in Morehead rested on more than the precedent in Adkins and
sought to sustain Adkins in principle. See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314-15. Thus, in
hindsight, Justice Roberts believed he should have concurred separately. See id. at 315. Charles
Curtis made a similar argument, suggesting that the vote in West Coast Hotel was probably
taken shortly after oral argument in mid-December and before the President's announcement.
If this is true, he writes, "the [court-packing] plan had nothing to do with the decision." CURTIS,
supra note 79, at x61. But cf. Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 1o5, at 634-36 & n.127 (noting
with barely controlled fury that the sixth reason given by the petitioner in Morehead for granting
the writ was to reconsider the holding in Adkins).
110 Frankfurter, supra note io, at 315. Interestingly, Justice Roberts's language in this
memorandum mimics the language used by Chief Justice Hughes in his Biographical Notes.
See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 81, at 312. This mimicry is especially
interesting because Justice Frankfurter's handwritten comments in his copy of the Pusey biography also note Roberts's failure to state his reasons for voting in Morehead as he did. See
MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (195I) (Frankfurter's personal copy), microfortned
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 39 ("He shouldn't have
suppressed his own views by silence.").
M An insightful evaluation of the Roberts memorandum is found in BOBB1TT, cited above
in note ii,at 39-4o. A less helpful analysis is David Burner, Owen J. Roberts, in 3 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 2253, 2261-62 (Leon Friedman ed., 198o), in which the author misleadingly states

that "Justice [Roberts] remembered having been quite prepared to overrule Adkins outright
... " Id. at 2261. The memorandum reads: "I said I saw no reason to grant the writ [in
Morehead] unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and overrule the Adkins case." Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314. Thus, Roberts does not say he was ready to overrule Adkins, but
uses the more lawyerly construction that he believed the Court should not hear the case unless
it was prepared to overrule Adkins. Because in Roberts's view the petition for certiorari urged
the Court to distinguish the statute in Adkins from the statute in Morehead, he may have been
implying that Adkins should not be disturbed.
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of 1936 Roberts was "prepared to overrule the Adkins decision.'

2

Aside from the memorandum, Frankfurter offered little evidence that
was not available in 1937, when Frankfurter himself was among the

most fervent of those who believed that Roberts had "switched" for
political reasons.

i. -

One reason the timing defense fails is that all of Roberts's

crucial votes occurred after the overwhelming reelection of Roosevelt.

W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews was decided on November 23,
1936, and the date of the initial vote in West Coast Hotel was December I9,1936.113 Also damaging to the timing defense is the fact that
the Court denied New York's petition to rehear Morehead on October
12, 1936, the same day the Court announced that certiorari was
4
granted in West Coast Hotel."
Instead of vindicating Roberts, the timing defense suggests (but
doesn't prove) the opposite: because the Washington Supreme Court
had upheld the constitutionality of its state minimum wage statute,
Roberts's vote to grant certiorari in West Coast Hotel and his vote to
deny rehearing in Morehead seemed to foreshadow, before the elec-

tion, another decision that would strike down a state minimum wage
law. The possibility that Roberts's vote to grant certiorari in West
Coast Hotel might be so understood seems more plausible given the
two misstatements in the memorandum: 15 first, because West Coast
Hotel's jurisdictional statement was the only document before the
Court as of October io, 1936, the constitutionality of the holding in

Adkins could not have been assailed before the petition was granted;
and second, the question at conference was not whether to dismiss

the case based on the Adkins and Morehead precedents, but whether
to reverse it. As Frankfurter acknowledges in a footnote to his tribute,
112 Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314.

113Perhaps even more importantly, the second vote in West Coast Hotel was taken on
February 6, 1937, one day after FDR's announcement of his bill to reorganize the federal courts.
The opinion was not issued until March 29, 1937. See id. at 315. Although the claim was that
Justice Roberts's initial vote in West Coast Hotel occurred before the announcement of the plan,
FDR's announcement almost certainly had a significant effect on the opinion ultimately written
by Chief Justice Hughes for the majority.
114 In the spring of 1937, Frankfurter was well aware of this counterargument, having made
it himself. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, supra note 5i, at i89-9o
("Roberts' somersault [is] incapable of being attributed to a single factor relevant to the professed
judicial process. Everything that he now subscribes to he rejected not only on June first last,
but as late as October twelfth when New York's petition for a rehearing was denied."). By
1955, only the interstice of the Reports noting the Court's order in Chamberlin was important.
l1S See Frankfurter, supra note io,at 315. As Professor Bobbitt notes, "since the Washington
Supreme Court had sustained the minimum wage statute, Roberts's vote to note probable
jurisdiction would appear to have an opposite import to the one he remembered." BOBBT,
supra note ii, at 40. At the end of the memorandum, the manner in which West Coast Hotel
came before the Court is accurately remembered. See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 315.
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because the Washington Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the act, "[e]vidently [Roberts] meant [West Coast Hotel] should
,,n6
be reversed summarily ....
2. - West Coast Hotel radically narrowed the Court's role in
assessing state economic regulation against due process constraints. It
also overruled Morehead, a case decided only ten months previously.
Because Justice Roberts joined the majority in both cases but wrote
an opinion in neither, Justice Frankfurter sought evidence of Roberts's
principled acceptance of this new "standard of review" in his other
opinions. The most logical choice was Roberts's majority opinion in
Nebbia v. New York, 117 which Justice Frankfurter relied on for his
second argument for the revised history.
Roberts's vote was necessary for a majority in Nebbia, and Justice
Frankfurter used the Nebbia opinion as evidence of a change in
Roberts's "judicial philosophy" well before FDR announced his courtreorganization plan. But to defend Justice Roberts's vote in West
Coast Hotel by citing his opinion three years earlier in Nebbia is
terribly misleading. Even Hughes did not think that Nebbia announced a change in judicial philosophy. As Pusey notes, "Nebbia v.
New York is sometimes said to reflect a sharp breaking away from
the doctrine of the Oklahoma ice case. Chief Justice Hughes did not
so regard it." 11 8 More importantly, to accept Nebbia as the crucial
substantive due process case requires one to ignore both Roberts's
language in Nebbia and the events of the intervening years.
The Nebbia opinion looked both forward and backward. It looked
forward by dispensing with labels or catch-phrases to decide the
case. 11 9 It looked backward, however, by reaffirming the Court's
authority substantively to review state economic legislation through
the Due Process Clause. 120 The Court held in Nebbia that a New
York law creating a Milk Control Board with the power to fix the
minimum and maximum price of milk did not violate the Due Process
116Frankfurter, supra note io, at 315 n.* (emphasis added). Curiously, in the Felix Frankfurter Papers, it is clear from a review of several drafts of the tribute that this footnote was
added after the initial drafting of the tribute. See Felix Frankfurter, undated draft of Mr.
Justice Roberts, microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at
Container 18x, at 7.
117 291 U.S. 502 (1934)118 2 PUsEy, supra note 6i, at 700. In his Holmes Lectures, Judge Learned Hand agreed

with Chief Justice Hughes. "The decision of a bare majority in 1934 that a state may fix the
price of milk was taken by some people as a coup de grace of the old doctrine, though it really
should not have been so taken ..
"LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 43 (1958) (footnote
omitted).
119 See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536 (asserting that due process decisions must rest on the
circumstances of each case, rather than on whether a business is "affected with a public interest"
or "clothed with a public use").
120 See id. at 539 (holding that price control "is unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt").
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Clause. 12 1 While upholding New York's action, however, Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized, at no fewer than six places in his opinion,
the constitutional boundaries on state laws that regulate business: The
law can be neither "arbitrary" nor "unreasonable.' 1 22 Determining
whether the regulation is reasonable "depends upon the relevant
facts."'1 23 Justice Roberts attempted at length to explain why the New
York law was -reasonable, and thus constitutional. The striking element of Roberts's opinion in Nebbia is not its holding, then, but its
reaffirmation of the Court's role. Important constitutional limitations
on state action that regulates economic relations remain that the Court
must police. But although Justice Roberts's opinion was "modern" in
the sense that it discarded the "affected with a public interest" doctrine, the opinion also made it clear that the Court's role in deciding
economic substantive due process cases had been altered only in degree, not in kind. The result is that Justice Roberts's opinion in
Nebbia is strikingly different in both force and tone from Chief Justice
Hughes's language in West Coast Hotel, in which he wrote that "[t]he
adoption of [minimum wage laws] by many States evidences a deepseated conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as to the
means adapted to check it. Legislative response to that conviction
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have
to decide."'1 24 It is the conclusory statements in West Coast Hotel,
and not Roberts's opinion in Nebbia, that indicate the real change in
judicial role.
Indications of a shift in 1934 were premature. Cases decided after
Nebbia and before West Coast Hotel show that demanding substantive
review remained the norm in cases involving socioeconomic legislation. Morehead, the next substantive due process case after Nebbia,
was also the only substantive due process case that the Court decided
between 1934 and I937. In Morehead, Justice Roberts voted to strike
down the minimum wage law. 125 Further, the Court's decision in
121 See id.
122 Id. at 521, 525, 530, 536,- 537, 539.
123 Id. at 525.

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
Morehead dissenters cited Nebbia as precedent for their position, see Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 625 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting), but Roberts
apparently was able to reconcile the "judicial philosophy" behind the two cases. That Nebbia
did not indicate a change in philosophical position by Roberts may be reflected in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936), decided one week before
Morehead. The federal statute at issue in Ashton was originally passed in 1934 to aid a large
number of debt-stricken local governmental entities. See id. at 527. Justice Roberts joined
Justice McReynolds's majority opinion, which concluded that Congress's power to establish
uniform laws on bankruptcy did not extend to including bankruptcy protections to a political
subdivision of a state. See id. at 527, 530. Justice McReynolds reached this conclusion because
he believed that any other conclusion would violate the principles of federalism, even though
state consent was necessary for the subdivision to utilize the bankruptcy law. See id. at 531.
124

12s The
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Nebbia did not resolve all of the legal questions about the constitutionality of the New York law. One year after Nebbia was decided,
a unanimous Court gutted the statute upheld in Nebbia by concluding
that its application to interstate sales of milk violated the Commerce
Clause. 126
During the October I935 Term, the Supreme Court decided two
more cases involving the constitutionality of the amended New York
Milk Control Act. Justice Roberts wrote both decisions. 12 7 In both
cases, milk producers claimed that the amended Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause. In the first case, Borden's Farm Products
Co. v. Ten Eyck, 128 Justice Roberts concluded that the State's decision
to permit the sale of unadvertised milk for up to one cent per quart
less than the price of advertised milk did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied to dealers, such as Borden's, that had a
well-advertised trade name. 129 Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Butler dissented. 130 Shortly after announcing the
Borden's Farm decision, Justice Roberts announced the Court's decision in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck. 13 1 The Court held that
another provision of the amended Milk Control Act, which prohibited
unadvertised dealers who began selling milk after the date of the
original Milk Control Act from receiving the price differential benefit
upheld in Borden's Farm, was arbitrary and unreasonable and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 13 2 This time, Justice Cardozo
dissented, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone. 133
Roberts's opinions in these two cases suggest that Nebbia did not
signal a change in his view of the Court's role in assessing economic
legislation challenged on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In a rare occurrence, possibly foreshadowing Morehead, Chief justice Hughes joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Cardozo.
126 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935).
127 See Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 270-74 (1936); Borden's Farm
Prod. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 256-64 (1936). The Supreme Court had also twice
visited the milk-control law after deciding Nebbia and before deciding these two cases. See
Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 203-13 (1934) (holding that a complaint
that alleged a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses stated a cause of action
and remanding for findings of fact and conclusions of law); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin,
293 U.S. 163, 168-72 (x934) (holding unanimously that a bill of complaint requesting an
injunction against enforcement of the act failed to state a cause of action). In Borden's Farm
v. Baldwin, Roberts voted with the majority. Concurring in the result were Justices Stone and
Cardozo.
128 297 U.S. 251 (1936).
129 See id. at 261.
130 See id. at 264-65 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
131 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
132 See id. at 274.
133 See id. at 274-78 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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Mayflower Farms evidences Justice Roberts's continued willingness in
early 1936 to use the constitutional boundaries reiterated in Nebbia to
strike down state economic legislation. In Mayflower Farms, as in
Nebbia, the judge's role was to determine whether the regulation was
"arbitrary" or "unreasonable" after properly weighing the relevant facts
and circumstances in the case before him. 134 Justice Roberts was able
to distinguish the Borden's Farm and Mayflower Farms cases because,
as he had written in Nebbia, "a regulation valid for one sort of
business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort,
or for the same business under other circumstances, because the rea135
sonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts."
6
Only two years before Nebbia, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 13
the Supreme Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Roberts, had held
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute regulating entry into the icemaking and selling business upon a showing of business necessity. 137
Nebbia was the only substantive due process case decided after New
State Ice and before Morehead. Nebbia did not mark a turn in the
Court's economic substantive due process cases; one can more easily
draw a line connecting New State Ice and Morehead than connecting
Nebbia and West Coast Hotel.
3. - Frankfurter's last piece of evidence, the Roberts memorandum, proved crucial in providing support for the revisionist history.
Not only did this document reveal the previously private deliberations
of Roberts, but it also bolstered the timing defense and allowed Frankfurter to argue that Roberts's change in "judicial philosophy" came
before the announcement of FDR's court-packing plan.
The relevance of the proof found in the memorandum, however,
is difficult to determine. First, I have several reservations concerning
the existence of this memorandum. This exculpatory memorandum
seems out of place given Roberts's self-effacing character, 138 particu134 See id. at 272; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); see also Letter from
Owen J. Roberts to Felix Frankfurter (May 20, 1930), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter
Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3 ("It seems to me that in every case, when all of the
facts and circumstances are clearly understood and properly weighed, there is a position that
must be eternally right.").
135Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525.
136 285 U.S.

262 (1932).

137 See id. at 278. In New State Ice, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts joined
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler in the majority. Justice Brandeis,
joined by Justice Stone, dissented. Justice Cardozo did not vote in the case. See also Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 322 (1932) (holding violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment a federal tax provision declaring gifts made within two years of donor's death as
made in contemplation of death). The decision in Heiner was announced on the same day as
New State Ice, and the vote was identical.
138 See Frankfurter, supra note io,at 312 ("Who am I to revile the good God that he did
not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo" (quoting
Roberts)).
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larly given his attempt, in his "judicial executor" letter to Frankfurter,
to avoid any encomiums or justifications of his work as a Supreme
Court Justice. 13 9 It also seems odd that the memorandum would have
been "given" to Frankfurter by Roberts on November 9, 1945, three
months after he had resigned and returned to Pennsylvania. 140 The
accuracy of this date seems even more implausible given that the
Supreme Court was in session. Further, the Court's inability to agree
on the contents of a letter that would recognize Roberts's service, and
Roberts's disgust with some members of the Court, make it unlikely
that Roberts would have traveled to the Court from Pennsylvania to
"give" Frankfurter this memorandum. 14 1 Furthermore, Roberts's cor139 I realize that this argument, based on my evaluation of Roberts's character, is the flipside
of the argument made by Griswold. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 347-49. Clearly, Roberts
wanted nothing to do with memorial tributes. In addition to his "judicial executor" letter of
1944, see supra note 86, Roberts wrote Frankfurter in November 1947 the following on the
back of an invitation to a memorial tribute to McReynolds:
Think of the lying and hypocracy [sic] that will be exhibited! I think I shall have nausea
from II to 4 on November 12th. I once reposed a trust in you [sic] I do not say you
betrayed that trust. I do say that, at the lowest, you miserably failed. I shiver when I
think that what is to happen to HFS [Harlan Fiske Stone] and J.C. McR. (McReynolds]
may happen to me. Shall I depend on you to forfeit it, or shall I write to the efficient
Marshal of the Court?
Note from Justice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Nov. x947), microformed on
Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3.
140 Professor Friedman suggested to me that the genesis of the Roberts memorandum is
related to the disastrous attempt by Chief Justice Stone to write a valedictory letter on behalf
of the members of the Court to Roberts upon Roberts's resignation. The second paragraph of
the draft of this letter contained as the final sentence, "You have made fidelity to principle your
guide to decision." Draft Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Owen J.
Roberts (no date), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel
4. Justice Black refused to accept this sentence, which outraged Frankfurter. See Letter from
Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Aug. 20, 1945), microforned on
Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 4. As a result, no letter was sent.
Frankfurter later sent a copy of the letters and Frankfurter's own file about this affair to Paul
Freund for Freund's history of the Hughes and Stone Courts. See Letter from Justice Felix
Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (July 6, 1958) (on file at the
Harvard Law School Library).
I disagree with Professor Friedman for several reasons. First, Frankfurter's correspondence
to Freund in 1958 suggested that this episode showed why he denigrated Stone. It was not
given to Freund to defend Roberts. See id. Second, Frankfurter believed that this episode was
another example of Black's unfitness to serve on the Supreme Court. Nothing in Frankfurter's
1945 diary mentions the Roberts valedictory letter episode, but there is a note in that diary
concerning Black's refusal to recuse himself in the Jewell Ridge case, decided in favor of the
union because of Black's vote. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine
Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161, 161 (1945). Black's former law partner had represented the
union before the Court. See LASH, supa note 84, at 263-64. Third, there is neither a direct
nor an indirect attack on either Black or Stone in the Roberts tribute, which I would have
expected if there were a connection between the memorandum and the failed letter episode.
Finally, there is no statement in the tribute along the lines of, "He made fidelity to principle
his guide to decision."
141 Professor Philip Kurland, Frankfurter's clerk during the October 1945 Term, has informed
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respondence with Frankfurter mentions no meeting between the two
from October 1945 through January 1946.142 Additionally, Frank-

furter's correspondence with the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review makes it clear that the draft tribute sent to the
law review contained no information explaining the creation of the
memorandum. Only after an editor, prompted by some members of
the faculty, wrote Frankfurter that there was some "feeling that some
readers may be confused over when and why the memorandum was
written,"1 43 did Frankfurter add the information about the date of the
memorandum. 144 Finally, the original memorandum is apparently
lost. Roberts destroyed his papers; thus, a copy is not available
me that, to his knowledge, Roberts did not visit the Court during that Term. Telephone
Interview with Philip B. Kurland, Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School (Dec.
3, 1993).

142 Further, I have found no memorandum from Roberts to Frankfurter of any sort dated
November 9, 1945, in the Felix Frankfurter Papers. Because that date fell on a Friday, it is
possible that Roberts traveled to Washington on that date to spend the weekend and met with
Frankfurter. The Frankfurter Papers contain letters from Roberts to Frankfurter dated July
16, 1945, July 28, 1945, August 6, 1945, August 30, '945, October 2, 1945, December 26, 1945
(2 letters), and January 12, 1946. None of these letters refers to any memorandum in any way.
See Letters from Justice Owen J. Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (July i6, 1945; July 28,
1945; Aug. 6, 1945; Aug. 30, 1945; Oct. 2, 1945; Dec. 26, 1945 (two letters); Jan. I2, 1946),

microforned on Harvard Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part I, Reel 3. In a
letter written to Justice Frankfurter and dated January 12, 1946, Roberts notes:
I've been to Washington quite often on Clemency Board and [???] and [???] Board
business; more often than not I go down on an early train and return the same day.
Once or twice I've spent the night at Elizabeth's house, but I've been on such a full
schedule that I've had no chance to see my friends. I'm looking forward to better luck
in the coming months.
Letter from Justice Owen J. Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 12, 1946), microformed
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part Im, Reel 3. This indicates, but does
not prove, that Roberts and Frankfurter had not seen each other for some time before the date
of the letter. It does appear, from the October 2, 1945, letter, that Frankfurter had visited
Roberts at Roberts's farmhouse at some time in September 1945, as he occasionally did before
returning to Washington for the opening of the Court's Term. See Letter from Justice Owen J.
Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 2, 1945), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers,
supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3.
143Letter from Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Article Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. i8, I956), microfoned on Library of Congress
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 181. Indeed, Leibold erroneously thought that
the memorandum had been written by Roberts "shortly before he died with the express purpose
that it be published." Id.
144 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Article Editor,
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Jan. 20, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 181. Frankfurter's response was, in pertinent
part:
The members of your Faculty are quite right and I am obliged to them for bringing me
to an explicit statement of the history and the date of the memorandum. I should have
done it in my original draft, but in an irrelevant kind of way I had a little feeling against
cluttering up a little piece like the one I wrote with the usual footnote apparatus.
Id. The date was, of course, not the only footnote in the tribute.
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through that collection. 145 In the mid-i96os, historian John Chambers
searched the Frankfurter Papers inconclusively for the original or a
copy of the memorandum.1 4 6 I have been unable to find the original
memorandum or a copy in my searches through the Frankfurter Papers. No one with whom I have spoken remembers ever seeing the
original memorandum. 14 7 The absence of the memorandum obviously
145See

LEONARD, supra note 86, at 184.
146 See John W. Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum Wage Cases,
io LABOR HIST. 44, 64 n.96 (1969). This footnote suggests that Chambers located the memorandum. The language is quite vague, however, and on close inspection, it appears that at
most what he found was a copy of something that seemed to be the memorandum. When I
located this note, I called the Library of Congress and asked them to send the document to me.
They were unable to find any such document in either set of Frankfurter papers. My research
assistant, Connie Liem, later traveled to the Library of Congress in an attempt to locate this
document. Again, with the assistance of the Library of Congress staff, no such document was
found. I have looked via microfilm through both sets of papers for this document without
success. I have found, however, a typescript copy of unsigned, undated material in the draft
of the tribute that is identical to the published memorandum. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts 6-8 (no date) (unpublished draft), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter
Papers, supra note 78, at Container 181.
147 I have spoken with Judge Thomas O'Neill, at the time a clerk to Justice Harold Burton,
who apparently acted as an initial intermediary between Frankfurter and the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, and he has no recollection of seeing the memorandum. Telephone
Interview with Judge Thomas O'Neill (May 24, x993). The editor-in-chief of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review at the time, Curtis Reitz, now a Professor at his alma mater, also
has no recollection of ever seeing the Roberts memorandum, although he did recall that Frankfurter was anxious to get the information it contained into print. Telephone Interview with
Curtis Reitz, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (May 27, 1993). Article editor
Arthur Leibold, whose January 18, 1956, letter to Frankfurter led to Frankfurter's footnote
explaining the circumstances surrounding the creation of the memorandum, also has no recollection of ever seeing the memorandum. Telephone Interview with Arthur W. Leibold, Jr.,
Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Washington, D.C. (June 1, 1993). Harvard Law School Professor
Andrew Kaufman, one of Frankfurter's two clerks during the October 1955 Term, did not work
on the tribute and thus does not recall seeing the Roberts memorandum. He does recall,
however, that Frankfurter worked on the tribute privately. Telephone Interview with Andrew
Kaufman, Professor, Harvard Law School (June 3, 1993). Frankfurter's other clerk for that
year, New York Law School Dean Harry A. Wellington, does not recall ever seeing the
memorandum or working on the tribute. Telephone Interview with Harry A. Wellington, Dean,
New York Law School (June 8, 1993). Professor Philip Kurland, Frankfurter's clerk during
the October 1945 Term, did not see the memorandum, although he further explained that this
information was not the type of information that Frankfurter would share with his clerks.
Telephone Interview with Philip B. Kurland, Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law
School (Dec. 3, 1993). Professor Richard D. Friedman, who has replaced the late Paul Freund
as the author of a history of the Hughes Court in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court of the United States, has stated that he has not located the Roberts
memorandum in Freund's files on the Hughes Court. Telephone Interview with Richard D.
Friedman, Professor, University of Michigan Law School (June i5, 1993).
The only possible note from Roberts to Frankfurter I have found that might relate to a
"switch" is a handwritten note by Roberts which states in its entirety, "I do realize it, and often
wonder why the hell I did it just to please the Chief!" Note from Justice Owen J. Roberts to
Justice Felix Frankfurter (no date), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers,
supra note 78, at Container 97. On the other side of this note is a handwritten note by
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prevents independent analysis of Roberts's views. The memorandum's
absence from the Frankfurter Papers also strikes me as odd, because
Frankfurter seemed at an early date to keep thorough records, even
of things that had much less historic importance.
Second, even if Roberts authored the memorandum printed in
Frankfurter's tribute, several factors cast doubt on the accuracy of its
contents. The tribute itself indicates that the memorandum was written more than eight years after the crisis of 1937, after Roberts had
resigned from the bench, and after repeated requests from Frankfurter. The memorandum was to be made public at Frankfurter's
discretion (likely only after Roberts's death), and contained two disturbing factual errors. 148 If the memorandum was written in i945,
only three of Roberts's colleagues were alive - Hughes, McReynolds,
and Stone - and by September 1948, Roberts was the sole survivor
of the 1937 Court: therefore, no one was alive to question Roberts's
actions as detailed in the memorandum. In 1951, Hughes's "princi-

pled" explanation of the voting in West Coast Hotel was also publicly
available. 149
Frankfurter: "[To] O.J.R. I hope you now realize what a door you opened in your - shall I
say - much-discussed Butler decision as to scope of 'general welfare.'" Id. The cataloguers
estimated that this message was written in November 1940. Professor Friedman directed my
attention to another version of this statement by Roberts; it can be found as a liner note located
at page 66 of Volume 297 of a set of the United States Reports owned by Frankfurter and kept
in his home study. That page of the Reports contains a broad statement, written by Roberts,
of Congress's general welfare power in the case of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936),
in which the Court declared unconstitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond
Congress's power to spend for the general welfare, see id. at 74-75. In Frankfurter's handwriting
appears the identical colloquy as quoted above. See id. at 66 (Felix Frankfurter's personal copy
in the possession of Andrew Kaufman, Professor, Harvard Law School; copy on file at the
Harvard Law School Library). If anything, these notes appear to support the belief that in
1936 Roberts was more firmly opposed to a broad interpretation of Congress's powers, and thus
to New Deal measures, than previously believed. It also supports the belief that Hughes
influenced the writing of Butler in a way that would later lead to a more congenial reception
by the Court to New Deal legislation. The dictum was used in 1937 by the new Court majority
in the Social Security Cases to construe Congress's power in a broad fashion. See Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 6rg, 640 (I937); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 59293 (1937).
14s The Roberts memorandum erroneously indicates that the Washington Supreme Court in

West Coast Hotel had held that the minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 315. At the end of the memorandum, however, this error is corrected;
Roberts noted that the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in West Coast Hotel.
See id. The initial draft of the tribute did not contain Frankfurter's note on this mistake. See
id. at 315 n.*. The note was added to the tribute when Frankfurter edited it. See Frankfurter,
supra note 146, at 7. The Roberts memorandum also erroneously states that the constitutional
validity of the holding in Adkins was assailed in the papers before the Court when probable
jurisdiction was noted. See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 315. The only document before the
Court when it granted probable jurisdiction was the jurisdictional statement of the hotel, which
wanted the Court to decide based on Adkins and Morehead, not to overrule them. See Amended
Statement as to Jurisdiction at 13-14, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), supra note io8, at 9o-91.
149

Part of the typed version of Hughes's BiographicalNotes, including Hughes's defense of
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Third, and maybe even more perplexing, is what the memorandum
does not contain, namely, an explanation for some of Roberts's other
votes in spring 1937.150 The memorandum does not speak of the
reasons for Roberts's votes with the majority in Jones & Laughlin
Steel and the Social Security Cases. i 51 As discussed above, 5 2 the
former, which broadly interpreted Congress's Commerce Clause
power, effectively overruled the 1936 case Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 153
his and Roberts's actions in deciding West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel, can be
found in the Frankfurter Papers. See Charles E. Hughes, Biographical Notes 26-28 (manuscript), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container
216.
150 This lacuna in the memorandum was noted in a letter by Professor Wallace Mendelson,
who corresponded with Frankfurter after publication of the Roberts tribute. Mendelson had
previously accepted the original history, as evidenced in a i95x book review of Hendel's
biography of Hughes. Mendelson wrote, "I remember (with the author) Hughes' letter to the
Senate, backed by a timely switch of position on the bench. That the letter and switch (along
with that of Mr. Justice Roberts) pretty certainly saved nine, is now generally conceded - and
one would have to be more na[i]ve than is permissible to suppose that Hughes intended
otherwise." Wallace Mendelson, Book Review, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 570, 570 (1951) (reviewing SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EvAN HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951)). After
publication of the Roberts tribute, Mendelson wrote Frankfurter, "[D]oesn't [Roberts's] concern
to be understood in the Minimum Wage cases imply a confession of 'guilt' for 'switching' in the
Commerce Clause cases?" Letter from Wallace Mendelson, Professor, University of Tennessee,
to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 15, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter
Papers, supra note 78, at Container 2o9. Frankfurter responded by explaining that his tribute
was intended to show that Roberts had not "switched" because of Roosevelt's court plan and
by claiming that the Commerce Clause decisions were not a reflection of a change in position
caused by the court-packing plan. See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Wallace Mendelson, Professor (Mar. 19, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers,
supra note 78, at Container 209. Six weeks later Frankfurter wrote another letter to Mendelson.
He stated, "Roberts was specifically charged with having changed his position on a specific
issue, i.e., the validity of minimum wage legislation in the West Coastcase, allegedly in response
to the President's 'Court-packing' plan. It is that specific, and what I would regard dishonorable,
change [sic] that I was repelling." Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Wallace Mendelson,
Professor (May 4, x956), microforrned on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note
78, at Container 209.
That Roberts would be accused of a "switch" with regard to a state law, and not with regard
to New Deal legislation, is not sensible, and in fact, Roberts and Hughes were accused by
scholars and others of switching with regard to both state and federal legislation. In his tribute
to Roberts, Griswold argued that Roberts's votes in Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social
Security Cases were "fully explicable simply as a natural development of his views." Griswold,
supra note 86, at 345. Even Hughes, in his BiographicalNotes, argues that the Court remained
independent from political considerations in both West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel.
See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 81, at 312-13; see also PUSEY, supra
note 56, at 51-53 (discussing the change in position of Hughes and Roberts in West Coast Hotel
and Jones & Laughlin Steel). Frankfurter's focus on the narrowness of the criticism in his
explanation to Mendelson is thus wholly unsatisfactory.
151See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937). The court-packing plan was still alive in Congress when these cases were
decided on May 24, 1937.
152 See supra p. 629.
153 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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in which Roberts had voted with the majority. The latter cases
distinguished into oblivion the opinion written by Roberts one year
before in United States v. Butler.'5 4 Additionally, the memorandum
never explains why Roberts failed to write a separate opinion in
Morehead. It offers instead a mea culpa. (Did the press of work
cause him to fall behind in his opinion-writing duties?)
C.
Frankfurter's handwritten comments, as well as his silence, in his
copy of Pusey's biography of Hughes cast further doubt on the significance, if not existence, of the memorandum. These notes make
no reference to the existence of the memorandum, and Frankfurter's
hand-written comments are in fact quite critical of Roberts's actions.
Frankfurter underlined the following sentence in Pusey's biography,
which concerned Morehead: "But counsel for New York missed his
opportunity. ' Frankfurter noted, "Too dogmatic. Serious question
whether to call for overruling rather than differentiating.' 15 6 On the
same page, after underlining the sentence, "[Morehead's] reactionary
tone was very distasteful to Roberts," Frankfurter wrote further, "He
shouldn't have suppressed his own views by silence." 5 7 At the point
at which Pusey discussed the West Coast Hotel decision, Frankfurter
offered in the margin an explanation he used four years later in his
tribute to Roberts. Frankfurter's handwritten comment was, "In West
Coast Hotel [the] issue of overruling Adkins had to be faced [and]
Roberts had been ready to do that, but . . . wasn't asked in Ti-

paldo."15 8 From this note, it seems possible to conclude that Frankfurter had discussed the minimum wage cases with Roberts. It remains unclear, however, whether the liner notes were supposed to
become part of the effort to set the record straight, or whether they
were notes designed to present a plausible explanation of Roberts's
actions. Further, it seems odd that, in his personal copy of Pusey's
biography, Frankfurter's liner notes made no mention of a memorandum that should have been in his possession for nearly six years.
Instead of marginalia criticizing Roberts's actions, a sympathetic reader
armed with a memorandum from Roberts himself probably would
have either ignored Pusey's interpretation or noted agreement with
Pusey's sympathetic treatment of Roberts. After all, Frankfurter be154 297 U.S. 1 (1936). This last "switch" has largely been ignored. But see Griswold, supra
note 86, at 345 (concluding that Roberts's votes in the Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social
Security Cases were "a natural development of his views").
155 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 701 (1951) (Frankfurter's personal copy),

inicrofortnedon Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part Ill, Reel 39.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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lieved in late 1955 that the memorandum from Roberts explained
Roberts's differing decisions in Morehead and West Coast Hotel as
based on the requests by counsel to distinguish or to overrule Adkins.
Frankfurter's published review of Pusey's biography made no mention of the court-packing fight;' 5 9 it did, however, note that application
of the Constitution "is not a mechanical exercise, but a profound task
of statecraft exercised by judges set apart from the turbulence of
politics." 160 This review, along with Frankfurter's private notes,
shows Frankfurter's strong concern for the proper role of the Court.
The notes may also suggest Frankfurter's willingness to revise history
to preserve the sanctity of the Court.
V.
And the print spilled on Justice Roberts' "switch in time," a matter of
great import to frankfurterians, has similarly needlessly polluted our
rivers and streams.
JOHN

H. SCHLEGEL, THE LINE BETWEEN
HISTORY AND CASENOTE

161

What is most important about Frankfurter's tribute is its effect:
his revised history of the constitutional crisis of 1937 became the
accepted history in legal academia. This new version allowed legal
academics to conclude that the decisions of Justice Roberts in the
spring of 1937 were the product of legal reflection, not political pressure. How the revised history became the accepted history is the
subject of this Part; why it became the accepted history is the subject
of Part VI. This Part describes the manner in which Frankfurter's
history became the accepted history through law review articles and
books, constitutional law casebooks, the works of Paul Freund, political scientists, and Frankfurter's biographers.
A.
The virtually unanimous acceptance by legal academics of Frankfurter's explanation, and the swiftness of its acceptance within the
legal academy, are worth recounting in detail. One reason for the
rapid acceptance of the revised history was the prominent position of
its author in legal academia. This prominence, in turn, secured broad
dissemination of Frankfurter's writing. The tribute was not only

159 See Felix Frankfurter, The Impact of Charles Evans Hughes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. x8,
1951, § 7, at i, 51 (reviewing MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES (195X)), reprinted in
OF LAW AND MEN 144, 144-50 (Philip Elman ed., 1956).
160 Id. at 149.
161 Schlegel, supra note 3, at 975.

1994]

A THRICE-TOLD TALE

published in the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review, but it was
also included in Of Law and Men,162 a compilation of Frankfurter's
writings published in 1956.
From there, Frankfurter's revised history of the constitutional crisis
of 1937 spread quickly throughout legal academia. Citing Frankfurter, Bernard Schwartz suggested in a 1957 book that the Court's
opinion in West Coast Hotel was decided on constitutional and not
political grounds, and that the same decision would have been handed
down even without the presence of FDR's plan. 16 3 In I959, the first
law review article to cite Frankfurter's tribute adopted Frankfurter's
claim: "The probable truth, while not subject to categorical demonstration, is that the change in the course of decisions, evident by the
spring of 1937, was not induced by the threat of 'packing,' but was
16 4
instead the product of a number of factors coinciding at that time."
In a lecture given in 196o, Professor Herbert Wechsler cited Frankfurter's tribute for the proposition that Roberts's vote in West Coast
Hotel was "falsely publicized.' 65 A 1963 book edited by Alan Westin,
a professor of government at Columbia, reprinted Frankfurter's tribute
and added that for Frankfurter "[tlo have known 'what really happened' while many historians and political scientists were weaving
elaborate myths about the Court's switch in 1937 must have been a
heavy burden." 1 6 6 In 1965, Harvard Law School Professor Arthur
Sutherland cited Frankfurter and concluded that Roberts's vote in
West Coast Hotel was unrelated to the court-packing plan and that
Roberts's vote in Jones & Laughlin Steel "need not be ascribed to
personal or institutional panic. Persuasion sometimes comes, after a
while, from the logic of events."1 67 In an exhaustive history of the
court-packing plan, Leonard Baker concluded that the question of
Roberts's reasons for changing his vote was "without a positive answer.' 68 Amazingly, even Frankfurter's bitter rival William 0. Doug162 Frankfurter, supra note io, reprinted in OF LAW AND MEN, supra note i59, at 204,
204-12.
163 See BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT:

CONSTITUTIONAL

REVOLUTION IN

RETROSPECT 20 & n.38 (1957).
164 Robert B. McKay, The Supreme Court and Its Lawyer Critics, 28 FORDHAM L. REV.

615, 628 (i959) (footnote omitted).
165 Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, io9 U. PA. L.

REV. 465, 465 (1961) (footnote omitted). The reason for Wechsler's aside was that this article
was originally given as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture.
166 ALAN F. WESTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 241 (1963). Westin

dedicated the book, "To Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter he sits." Id. at vii.

scholar of the Constitution, wherever

167 ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 499 (1965).
168 BAKER, supra note ii, at 177. Baker would later author a dual biography of Louis D.

Brandeis and Frankfurter. See LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL
BIOGRAPHY (1984); see also BAKER, supra note 5i, at i89 (concluding that the switch likely
resulted from 'the rising clamor against the Court"); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND
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las vouched for Frankfurter's revised history. In his autobiography
Go East, Young Man, Douglas defends Roberts from claims that
Roberts switched. 169 Citing Frankfurter's tribute, and relying on the
timing of Roberts's initial vote in West Coast Hotel, in late-December
1936, Douglas triumphantly concluded, "Thus do journalists and
70
others on the sidelines often jump to wrong conclusions."1
This revised history has largely filtered down to the present. A
number of articles in the Journal of Supreme Court History conclude
that there was no "switch" in 1937.171 In a recent article, Harvard
Law School Professor Emeritus Benjamin Kaplan cited Frankfurter's
tribute for the proposition that "Roberts' role in this [switch] has
perhaps been too harshly criticized. "172 Professor David Currie, author of a recent two-volume history of constitutional law in the Supreme Court, wholly adopts the revised history. 173 Currie cites FrankCONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968,

at 79

(1970)

("Whether Hughes had engineered this turn of events as a matter of basic professional conviction
or as a matter of political opportunism - and in the nature of the circumstances, there was an
inevitable admixture of these - the fact was that he had carried the thing off with brilliance
and aplomb."). Swindler neither cites Frankfurter's tribute nor discusses at all Roberts's role in
the constitutional revolution of 1937. See id.
169 See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 325-26 (1974). Douglas's defense of
Roberts's actions in 1937 stands in stark contrast to his refusal in 1945 to join a valedictory
letter to Roberts upon his retirement as long as the letter contained the sentence, "You have
made fidelity to principle your guide to decision." See supra note 140.
170 DOUGLAS, supra note r69, at 326. Douglas expends a great deal of effort attacking
Frankfurter for telling Douglas that he opposed the plan while writing letters to FDR in support
of it. See id. at 324. Douglas's defense of Roberts is predicated in part on attacking Frankfurter.
"The only prevaricator was Frankfurter, who had been promised a seat on the Court and was
swinging along with FDR as the price of getting it." Id. at 327. Although Douglas was
convinced that he had skewered Frankfurter, the last laugh may belong to Frankfurter.
171 See Pusey, supra note 83, at lO6 (concluding that Roberts did not switch as a result of
FDR's court plan); Merlo J. Pusey, The Hughes Biography: Some Personal Reflections, 1984
Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'v 45, 46 (same); Robert L. Stern, The Court-Packing Plan and the
Commerce Clause, 1988 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 9i, 96 (concluding that it was plausible
that Hughes was consistent in his Commerce Clause votes, but that "Roberts's opinions and
votes in I935 and 1936 are difficult to reconcile with his joining in the Labor Board decisions
in 1937"). Stern wrote in 1946 that government lawyers were convinced that FDR's courtpacking plan was the basis for the Court's reversal. See Stern, supra note 73, at 681-82. In
1988, Stern wrote, "The speculation in my 1946 article ... implies much more certainty on the
subject than I now have." Stern, supra, at 96; cf. Warner W. Gardner, Court Packing: The
DraftingRecalled, 1990 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 99, 102 (noting that the timing of the West Coast
Hotel vote suggests that Roberts and Hughes may have changed without regard to the courtpacking plan). But see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., A Personalized View of the Court-Packing Plan,
1990 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93, 97 (concluding that Roberts's switch in Jones & Laughlin Steel
could have resulted only from the court-packing plan).
172 Benjamin Kaplan, The Great Civil Rights Case of Hague v. CIO: Notes of a Survivor,
25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 913, 931 (1991).
173 See DAVID

P.

CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND

CENTURY 1888-1986, at 236 (i99o).
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furter and Pusey for the proposition that Roberts voted in West Coast

Hotel before the plan was made public and concludes that "it was not

74
clear that Roberts had actually changed his mind."'
Another influential legal text which adopts the revised history is
175
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System.
Although the first edition, published in 1954, merely noted the courtpacking plan, 176 the second edition,, published eighteen years later,
cited both Frankfurter's tribute and a 1967 article by Harvard Law
School Professor Paul Freund as the sources for "the role of Justice
77
Roberts in the Parish [sic] case.'1

B.
The adoption by many constitutional law casebooks of the revised
history of Justice Roberts's switch played an even more important role
than constitutional histories and law review articles in disseminating
the revised history. Beginning in 1959 and largely continuing today,
a number of constitutional law casebooks have cited Frankfurter's
tribute as evidence that Roberts probably was not influenced by the
court-packing plan. 178 Before then, constitutional law casebooks rou-

174

Id.

175 PAUL

M.

BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO

& HERBERT

WECHSLER, HART

AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973).

Bator and

Shapiro both taught at Harvard Law School. Wechsler taught at Columbia University. Mishkin
moved from the University of Pennsylvania to the University of California at Berkeley after the
publication of the second edition.
176 The first edition of the book, published in 1954, mentions the court-packing plan at the
end and quotes, in order, from Hughes's statement of May ig, 1934, to the American Law
Institute; from FDR's February 5, 1934, message regarding court reorganization; and from
Hughes's March 21, 1937, letter, assentled to by Brandeis and Van Devanter, to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1395-1403 (ist ed. 1954).

The book was dedicated, "To

Felix Frankfurter, who first opened our minds to these problems." Id. at ix.
177 BATOR, MISHKIN, SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, supra note 175, at 44 n.61; see also PAUL M.

BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 42 n.6i (3d ed. 1988) (citing both the
Frankfurter and the Freund articles for Roberts's role in West Coast Hotel). According to the
authors of the second edition, the late Professor Bator was ultimately responsible for Chapter
I, in which this quotation is found. See BATOR, MISHKIN, SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, supra note
175, at xvii. Professor Mishkin, one of the authors of the second and third editions, also cited

Frankfurter's tribute in his 1982 Owen J. Roberts Lecture, and cautioned that his citation of
Frankfurter was "not to give any credence to the famous supposed 'switch in time' on the
validity of minimum wage legislation." Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections
on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 907,
907 n.i (1983).

178 See EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., PAUL W. BRUTON & JOHN HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 210-1I (ist ed. 1959) [hereinafter BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD,
FIRST EDITION]; NOEL T.

DOWLING

&

GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
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tinely ignored the change in voting by Hughes and Roberts, largely
because there seemed to be nothing to say in defense of their actions.
In 1954, four constitutional law casebooks were published. Two
books, authored by Walter Dodd and Noel Dowling, ignored the
court-packing episode altogether,' 7 9 while a third, edited by Paul
Kauper, only briefly mentioned the proposed court reorganization
0 The most extensive coverage given to the constitutional crisis
plan. 18
of 1937 is a note on FDR's court reorganization plan found in the
casebook edited by Paul Freund, Arthur Sutherland, Mark DeWolfe
Howe, and Ernest J. Brown, all professors at Harvard Law School. 181
STITUTIONAL LAW 265-69, 878 n.i (7th ed. 1965) [hereinafter DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH
EDITION]; 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK D.W. HOWE & ERNEST J.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS x630 (ist ed. 1954); JOHN E.
NovAx, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 n.16 (ist ed.
1978) (omitting the cite to Frankfurter but nevertheless concluding "[Justice] Roberts' switch
thus represented an actual change in conviction and not merely a shift with the political winds
caused by announcement of the court-packing plan," and citing ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED
A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 764 (4th ed.
1970) [hereinafter KELLY & HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION], in which Kelly and Harbison reversed their view of Justice Roberts's votes, and called them "principled"); JOHN E. NOWAK,
RONALD J. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.6, at 35 n.x6 (3d ed.
1986) (making the same argument but adding as support a citation to Justice Frankfurter's
tribute); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-6, at 449 & n.18 (Ist ed.
1978) (omitting cite to Frankfurter's tribute, but citing Arthur Sutherland's Constitutionalism in
America, which itself cites the tribute, see SUTHERLAND, supra note 167, at 496-97). One
casebook cited the Frankfurter tribute but used it much more cautiously. See PAUL BREST &
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 302 (2d ed. 1983) ("Although there are indications that [Roberts] cast his sustaining vote in
the later case [West Coast Hotel] before Roosevelt presented Congress with the court-packing
bill, the received notion is that Roberts' fear of the bill caused him to make 'the switch in time
that saved nine.' Whatever Roberts' motivation, Roosevelt's court-packing plan ultimately
failed." (footnote omitted)).
Several casebooks only briefly mention the court-packing plan, often with a summary conclusion. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 157-58 (ist ed. 2964) (quoting Robert L. Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the NationalEconomy, 1939-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 681-82 (1946)).
Compare JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 189 (1st ed. 1975) (briefly mentioning the court-packing plan and stating that "[u]nder
the threat of court-packing, however, the court recanted") with JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS
DIENES, WAYNE MCCORMACK & MARTIN H.

POLICY 96 (4 th ed.

REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND

("Whether for its own reasons or under the threat of court-packing,
See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R.

1992)

the Court recanted.").
SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I68 (ist ed. 1986) ("Whether or not
[Justice Roberts's] behavior made sense to him, his position was widely characterized as 'the
switch in time that saved Nine."').
179 See WALTER F. DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (sth ed. 1954); NOEL T.
DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1954); FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE &
BROWN, supra note 178; PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(ist ed. 1954).
180 See KAUPER, supra note 179, at I1-12.
181See i FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, supra note 178, at 241-44.
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What is most curious about this note, however, is what it does not
say. In their synopsis of FDR's court reorganization plan, the authors

182
managed entirely to avoid discussing the switch by Justice Roberts.

In 1959, the first constitutional law casebook to cite Frankfurter's

tribute -

perhaps also "the first truly modern postwar constitutional

law casebook"' 8 3 - was Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Paul W. Bruton,
and John Honnold's Constitutional Law.' 8 4 Discussing FDR's plan,
the authors cited Frankfurter's tribute for the proposition that Roberts

had not switched his vote.185 The authors carefully withheld judgment of the strength of the evidence, although they noted that the

"memorandum does not deal with the relationship between the Carter
case... and the Jones & Laughlin case.

' 18 6

Two years later, Freund

and his co-authors added to their discussion of substantive due process
a note citing Justice Frankfurter's tribute. 187 The authors commented,

"Mr. Justice Roberts prepared a contemporaneous memorandum concerning his 'vote' in the Parrish case. "188 Frankfurter's tribute states
that Roberts's memorandum was prepared in 1945, not contemporaneously. 189
The most influential constitutional law casebook to utilize Frankfurter's tribute has been Professor Gerald Gunther's Constitutional
Law. 190 After becoming co-author of the Dowling casebook beginning

with the seventh edition, Gunther not only cited the Frankfurter
tribute, but he also seemed to accept the proposition that, at least

with respect to the decision in West Coast Hotel, Justice Roberts had
182 See id.
183William Cohen, Preface to the Eighth Edition of EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., WILLIAM
COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at xxiv (8th
ed. 1989) (referring to BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 178).
184 See BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, FIRST EDITION, supra note 178, at 211.
18s See id. at 210-II.
186 Id. at 211. Subsequent editions of the casebook left unchanged this brief analysis of the
effect of the court-packing plan on Roberts's votes. See, e.g., EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 225 n.I (Sth ed. 1977); EDWARD L. BARRETT,
JR. & WILLIAM COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 200 n. i (7th ed. 1985);
BARRETT, COHEN & VARAT, supra note 183, at 221 n.I; WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 204 n.I (9th ed. 1993). But see NOEL
T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287 n.2 (6th ed. i959) ("Whatever its bearing
on the course of decisions or the fortune of the Court, it is a fact that in the period after Alton
and Schechter and before Jones & Laughlin . . . , President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted
to Congress, February 1937, a proposal for the reorganization of the federal courts."); RAY
FORRESTER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 783 (Ist ed. 1959) (defending Justice

Roberts on the ground that "the conference vote by the Court on the case was taken in January,
1937 [sic], before the court plan was known").
187See 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK D.W. HOWE & ERNEST J.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1327 (2d ed. i96I).

188 Id.
189 See Frankfurter, supra note 1o, at 314 n.*.
190 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975).
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not switched his vote in response to FDR's Court packing. 19 1 Discussing the effect of the court-packing plan on the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Gunther wrote:
West Coast Hotel, in particular, provoked the charge that Justice
Roberts had changed his position in the face of the Roosevelt challenge
- the 'switch in time' that supposedly 'saved the Nine.' But, as a
memorandum left by the Justice demonstrates, the Court voted in
West Coast Hotel weeks before the judicial reorganization plan was
1 92
announced.

He then cited Justice Frankfurter's tribute. 193 Also found in the
seventh edition was a footnote added by Gunther to the primary case
of West Coast Hotel. This footnote was appended to the sentence in
Chief Justice Hughes's opinion, which stated that Morehead was decided as it was because New York counsel asked the Court only to
distinguish, not to reconsider Adkins, 194 and directed the reader to
Justice Roberts's memorandum regarding why he voted with the majority in both Morehead and West Coast Hotel. 195 Although Professor
Gunther cautioned the reader to compare Justice Roberts's pre- and
post-I 9 3 7 commerce clause and taxing power votes, the attention
given to Justice Roberts's behavior concerning the minimum wage
cases suggests an acceptance of Frankfurter's revisionist history.19 6
Beginning in the ninth edition and continuing to the present edition
with only minor changes, Professor Gunther's casebook has read:
It is nevertheless clear that constitutional doctrine changed significantly during this period. But arguing that the shift was a response
to the Court-Packing Plan is easiest with respect to national powers
doctrines; with respect to due process, West Coast Hotel is certainly
of a deferential piece with the pre-Court-packing decision in 1934
(written by Justice Roberts) in the Nebbia case. 197

191 See DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 268, 878 n.i. Although Professor Dowling remained the lead author of the casebook, the seventh edition was
edited by Professor Gunther. See Gerald Gunther, Preface to DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH
EDITION, supra note 178, at xi-xii.
192 DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 268.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 878.
195 See id. at 878 n.i.
196 See id.
197 GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION, supra note ii, at 457; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 467 (iith ed. 1985); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 534 (xoth ed.

198o); GUNTHER, supra note 19o, at 583. Professor Gunther's approach to the "switch in time"
through the twelfth edition of his casebook has remained largely the same. As if to emphasize
the view that it is Nebbia, not West Coast Hotel, that marks a turn in the Court's economic
substantive due process jurisprudence, Nebbia remains a primary case throughout the editions;
in contrast, West Coast Hotel has been relegated to the notes following Nebbia. After the 11th
edition, West Coast Hotel was changed from a primary to a note case, and Gunther's reiteration
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All three of Justice Frankfurter's defenses - timing, Nebbia, and
Justice Roberts's memorandum - were thus accepted by Professor
Gunther, whose casebook has been the most widely used constitutional
8 With the
law casebook for much of the last twenty-five years. 19
near
universal adoption of Frankfurter's position in casebooks, the revised
history of Roberts's "switch" was secured.
C.
In 1967, the eminent constitutional law scholar Paul Freund' 9 9
twice cited the tribute of his mentor Felix Frankfurter while discussing
Justice Roberts's switch. In evaluating the contributions of Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Freund wholly adopted the claim that
Justice Roberts switched his position in West Coast Hotel before the
Court Plan was announced. 20 0 From Freund's perspective, "[t]his is
entirely in keeping with Roberts's character, which led him to react
violently against what he thought was intellectual slipperiness and
sometimes to decide cases on a seemingly impressionistic, ad hoc
basis."'20 1 The other citation is found in the third edition of the
constitutional law casebook co-authored by Freund. The book retained the mention of Justice Roberts's voting change in West Coast
Hotel, as well as the erroneous statement that the memorandum was
prepared contemporaneously with his decision in West Coast Hotel.20 2
Over twenty years later, Freund again cited Justice Frankfurter's
of Justice Roberts's votes was made part of the note following West Coast Hotel, rather than a
footnote added by him to the case. See GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION, supra note ii, at i2224, 455-57. Other casebooks have also placed Nebbia and West Coast Hotel together. See,
e.g., 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK D.W. HOWE & ERNEST J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1621-30 (3d ed. 1967) (placing Nebbia
and West Coast Hotel as back-to-back primary cases); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR
& JESSE H. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 332-35 (2d ed.
1967) (placing West Coast Hotel as a note case immediately following primary case of Nebbia);
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 375-78 (ist ed.

i981) (placing West Coast Hotel as a note case immediately following primary case of Nebbia).
198 See Letter from Charles Taibi, Foundation Press, to Michael Ariens, Professor (June 9,
1993) (on file at the Harvard Law School Library). The following provides a sampling of the
number of adoptions of Professor Gunther's Constitutional Law casebook: 9 th edition (1977),
113 adoptions; ioth edition (1982), 135 adoptions; iith edition (I987), 125 adoptions; and 12th
edition (1992), IO9 adoptions. Foundation Press has no record of the number of adoptions of
the 7th or 8th editions of the casebook, and it has a policy of not publicly releasing the total
sales of a book. See id. The highest number of adoptions of Professor Gunther's book was 147
in i98o, the first year of the ioth edition. Telephone Interview with Charles Taibi, Foundation
Press (June 9, 1993).

199 See generally Paul A. Freund, HARv. L. BULL., June 1992, at 16 (describing Freund's
accomplishments).
200 See Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARv. L. REV. 4, 2930 (1967).
201
202

Id. at 30.
See 2 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, supra note 197, at 1630.
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tribute as authority, 20 3 although he was less certain that Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes had not changed their votes as a result
20 4
of FDR's court reorganization plan.
Freund also played a central role in planting Justice Frankfurter's
revised history in another text: Thomas Reed Powell's Vagaries and
Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation.20 5 Vagaries and Varieties
was based on the Carpentier lectures given by Powell at Columbia
Law School in April and May of 1955, and was intended to be a
summing up of Professor Powell's work in teaching and writing about
constitutional law.
While discussing Roberts's change of mind, Powell stated: "[Justice
Roberts] saw a somewhat flickering white light on the road to Damascus after the election of 1936 and before the proposal of the socalled Court Plan of 1937. ' 206 After "1936" in the text, a lengthy
footnote was appended that attempted to explain Justice Roberts's
decisionmaking processes3 0 7 The footnote concludes: "Thus Mr. Justice Roberts's position in the two cases [Morehead and West Coast
Hotel] can be harmonized as the view of one who was unable to
distinguish the Adkins case but who would accept an opportunity to
overrule it."208 Powell, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard
Law School from 1925 to 1949, trained in both political science and
law, was a master at dissecting Supreme Court opinions and exposing
biases hidden within judicial decisions. 20 9 Coming from the skeptical
203 See Paul A. Freund, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Resistance to the New Deal: Benchmarksfrom the Federal Courtsfor Massachusetts, 74 MASS. L. REV. 234, 238 (z989).
204 See id. Freund wrote: "Was the seeming turnabout, involving especially Hughes and
Roberts, due to the President's 'Court-packing' plan? The question is probably unanswerable,
even by the subjects of the inquiry, given the subtle, atmospheric, imperceptible elements that
play upon one's mind and judgment." Id. Freund's statement may have been his considered
judgment after decades of study, or may have been simply a dramatic rendering in a short
article discussing the Massachusetts connection to New Deal cases.
205 See THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-

TATION (1956).
206 Id. at 8i (footnote omitted).
207 See id. at 8i n.89.
208 Id.
209 See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-196o, at 5o-51 (1986). One of
Powell's quips skewered both the Supreme Court and the Restatement of the Law project of
the American Law Institute. In his mock Restatement of Constitutional Law, Powell suggested
that the Court's decisions in dormant commerce clause cases should be restated to the effect
that the black letter law is that Congress may regulate commerce, the states may regulate
commerce some, but not too much; and the comment to the black letter law should state, "how
much is too much is beyond the scope of [t]his Restatement." GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION,
supra note ii, at 254 n.i. For memorial tributes to Powell, see Erwin N. Griswold, Felix
Frankfurter, Paul A. Freund & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARv. L. REv.
793, 793-805 (1956). See also Paul A. Freund, Powell, Thomas Reed, in DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHYi1951-1955, at 549, 549 (John A. Garraty ed., Supp. V 1977) (noting
that Powell would often "expose [the] lack of candor, question-begging, and logical lacunae"
behind judicial opinions).
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and critical mind of T.R. Powell, this statement gives an authority to
the revised history and forces one to consider the possibility that the
revised history is the accurate history.
Professor Powell, however, never wrote this footnote. Powell died
on August i6, 1955, shortly after giving the Carpentier lectures. The
task of editing these lectures into book form fell largely to Freund,
who stated that the "principal task has been to document the text by
furnishing the footnote references, occasionally with some explanation. ''2 10 Thus, this footnote, which mouths the explanation given by
Justice Frankfurter, both in the tribute and in a 1953 letter to Freund,

came not from Powell, but from Freund. 21 '

Consequently, giving

credence to the footnote forces one to decide whether to believe

Freund's, and thus Justice Frankfurter's, interpretation of Justice Roberts's voting behavior. It is not Powell's conclusion, and it is not an
independent assessment of the validity of the revised history, as some

have used

it.212

Freund was also Justice Frankfurter's handpicked author of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the

United States for the 193o-41 era, the years during which Hughes
210 Paul A. Freund, Foreword to POWELL, supra note 205, at x. Columbia Law School
Dean William Warren, in his preface to Powell's book, wrote that "Professor Freund is very
modest when he describes his work and that of his colleague [Ernest J. Brown] as 'furnishing
the footnote references, occasionally with some explanation."' William C. Warren, Preface to
POWELL, supra note 205, at xv.
211 See Frankfurter, supra note io, at 314; Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A.
Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (Oct. 8, 1953), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter
Papers, supra note 78, at Part Im, Reel 15. Freund stated that "[a]fter the lectures were delivered
Professor Powell made some slight revisions in all of them. He marked the text with footnote
signs but did not supply the footnotes themselves." Paul A. Freund, Foreword to POWELL,
supra note 205, at x. This may indicate that Powell himself wanted to insert the material that
Freund provided in footnote 89 but was unable to do so due to his untimely death. Freund
later indicates, however, that "[a]t a very few points in the manuscript we took occasion to
correct a slip of memory or clarify an ambiguity that would not have survived the author's
further scrutiny." Id. Freund does not state at which points in the text such ambiguities or
slips of memory occurred.
Further, the correspondence between Justice Frankfurter and Powell located in both sets of
papers contains no indications that the two ever discussed Justice Roberts's actions during the
spring of 1937. See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78; Thomas Reed Powell Papers,
Harvard Law School Library.
Although there may be an issue concerning timing, given that Vagaries and Varieties was
published only a few months after the tribute, a letter from Justice Frankfurter reveals that
Freund was given an advance peek at the Frankfurter revisionist history in a letter to him from
Frankfurter sent in October 1953. See supra note 78. The October 1953 letter models the
explanation or "synthesis" undertaken in footnote 89 to Powell's Vagaries and Varieties. Freund
thus had ample time and opportunity to formulate the argument made in footnote 8o of Vagaries
and Varieties. However, because Powell gave his lectures in April and May of 1955, and died
on August i6, 1955, it would have been impolitic for the footnote to cite to Frankfurter's future
tribute.
212 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 173, at 236 n.162.
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was Chief Justice. Although Freund never completed this history, 213
the tentative title - Depression, New Deal and the Court in Crisis,
193o-4i suggests that he intended to devote considerable attention
to the crucial event of this period, the 1937 crisis and Roberts's "switch
214
in time." The correspondence between Freund and Frankfurter
illustrates Frankfurter's deep and abiding interest in making the revised history the official history.
D.
Some political scientists of the post-World War II generation were
more skeptical of the revised history than were their counterparts in
law schools. 2 15 In part, this was because political scientists viewed
213 For a critical attack on Freund's editorial directorship of the Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise history, see Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 n.2 (x989)
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35
(1988)). Justice Frankfurter's attempt to influence the entire Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court, including the history of the crisis of 1937, is well documented
in several of his letters to Freund. See Letters from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund,
Professor, Harvard Law School (Jan. i8, 1963; Sept. 24, x963; June 13, 1964 [Library of
Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, indicate that this letter was dated June 3, x964];
July I, x964), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 38.
214 See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78. Freund's papers are presently being
catalogued at the Harvard Law School Library and are not yet available for review. However,
Professor Richard Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School possesses Freund's papers
relating to the history of the Hughes Court.
215 Chief among the skeptics was Alpheus T. Mason, whose many published books and
articles followed the original history of Roberts's actions and largely ignored Frankfurter's
tribute. Although Mason was aware of the tribute, he only mentioned it briefly in his essay on
Roberts in the Dictionary of American Biography. See Alpheus T. Mason, Roberts, Owen
Josephus, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 1951-1955, supra note 209, at 571, 574.
It is a curious essay. To some extent, Mason accepts the revisionist history that Roberts did
not retreat in West Coast Hotel because New York counsel in Morehead asked only to distinguish
Adkins. Mason also, however, criticizes Frankfurter's tribute to Roberts, although for whatever
reason, Mason's essay does not mention the memorandum itself. See id. Mason also suggests
at one point that Roberts was simple-minded and did not switch as a result of the 1936 election.
Later in the essay, though, he calls the change of mind by "Hughes-Roberts" a "switch." See
id.
Frankfurter and Mason were not friends. Their relationship may have been colored by
Mason's view of the politics of judging, and in particular, by his caustic view of Hughes. See
J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Alpheus T. Mason and the Art of Judicial Biography, 8 CONST.
COMMENTARY 41, 48-49 (i991) (noting that "Mason's dislike of Hughes was a standing joke
among his graduate students of my generation"). In Mason's eyes, Hughes was the villain of
the constitutional crisis of 1937 - in large part because he was a conservative who wanted to
be perceived as a liberal and because, in Mason's rendering, he manipulated the law to make
it conform to his subjective preferences. Frankfurter, in turn, regularly denounced both Mason
and his work. See Letters from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard
Law School (July r, 1964; Feb. 20, 1956; Oct. 24, 1955; undated [October 22-23, 1950]); Note
from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (undated
[approx. April 1956]); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Arthur W. Cowan, Esq., (Oct. 24, 1958),
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 38. Professor
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the Court as a political institution and generally were less concerned
about maintaining the viability of the law/politics split. 2 16 Despite the

different lens through which political scientists viewed the Court,
however, this skepticism often vanished after they evaluated Frankfurter's tribute and the Roberts memorandum. For example, in 1962,
Walter Murphy cited Frankfurter's tribute for the proposition that
Roberts had not switched his vote in West Coast Hotel as a result of
Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Murphy reached this conclusion even
though he noted that some court plan was expected even before it
was announced in February 1937, and in spite of Justice Roberts's
testimony in 1954 that the Court was under tremendous strain during
the crisis. 2 17 Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison were also
deeply affected by the revised history.2 18 In the third edition of their
Melvin Urofsky states that he was told by Pearl von Allman, the University of Louisville's late
law librarian, that Frankfurter retrieved his letters to Brandeis from the Brandeis collection at

the University of Louisville "because he did not want Alpheus Mason (then working on a
Brandeis biography) to see them." MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 219 (i99i); see also Clyde Spillenger, Reading the
Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM. HIST.

125, 131 (1992)

(noting that "Frankfurter, whose distaste for Alpheus Mason's writings on Brandeis led him to
obstruct Mason's research efforts, [also] encouraged Bickel and Freund to take up Brandeis as
a subject").
216 Two excellent examples of the perspective of political scientists in the post-World War H
era regarding the political nature of the Supreme Court are found in the 1965 Rosenthal Lecture
given by political scientist William M. Beaney and in Mason's and Beaney's textbook.
If political science is the study of how the "political system" makes "authoritative allocations of value" in any society, it follows that no apology is needed for a continuing
concern with the American Supreme Court, which, more than other courts in the AngloAmerican or the Civil Law system, has from the beginning made, and is expected to
make, many of the crucial allocations of values in our society. It is, then, in Professor
Rosenblum's felicitous phrase, "a political instrument," and should be judged in that
light.
William M. Beaney, The Supreme Court: The Perspective of PoliticalScience, in MAX FREEDMAN, WILLIAM M. BEANEY & EUGENE V. ROSTO1,V, PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURT 34-35 (1967)

(footnotes omitted). In their casebook Mason and Beaney argue that
The Supreme Court has always consisted largely of politicians, appointed by politicians,
confirmed by politicians, all in furtherance of controversial political objectives. From
John Marshall to Warren Burger, the Court has been the guardian of some particular
interest and the promoter of preferred values.
ALPHEUS T. MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw at xiii (6th
ed. 1978).
217

See MURPHY, supra note 18, at 59-60 n.*; see also ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER,

supra note 9, at 392-93 ("The accusation about 'Roberts' Switch' arose from his conduct in two
cases, conduct that was gravely misunderstood not only by the public but by the legal profession.").
218 Compare ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 759-60 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter KELLY & HARBISON, THIRD

EDITION] (arguing that Justice Roberts was aware of the political implications of his change of
heart, but that he did not necessarily act "merely to defeat the court plan") with KELLY &
HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 764 (decrying as "simple" any interpretation
of Justice Roberts's switch that ignored the new evidence of his principled change in conviction).
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history of the American Constitution, published in 1963, they had
concluded that the reversal of Hughes and Roberts was "shrewdly
calculated" 219 and that it was "scarcely conceivable" that the two
220
Justices "were unaware of the political implications of their move."
In the fourth edition of their book, published in 1970, the authors
reversed their opinion, relying on evidence initially provided by
Frankfurter: "In short, Roberts' dramatic shift on minimum wage
legislation reflected principled conviction on his part and not mere
22 1
political opportunism."
After Frankfurter's tribute, the most thorough attempt to return
to the original case that Justice Roberts "switched" is John Chambers's
article, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage
Cases.222 Professor Chambers drew two conclusions: first, that "a
combination of pressures - presidential, congressional, and most important, public - convinced Roberts that he must accept the new
philosophy and interpret the Constitution in line with the times;" 2 23
and second, that Roberts's "memorandum is both ambiguous and
contrived. '224 The first conclusion modified the initial interpretation,
for Chambers relied on evidence of public unrest more than FDR's
court-packing threat. 2 25 Although I agree with Chambers's second
conclusion, it deflects us from a fuller understanding of the memorandum's purpose. Chambers was convinced that Roberts wrote it to
enhance his reputation posthumously; I am convinced, however, that
Frankfurter published the memorandum less to defend Roberts and
more to reassert the Supreme Court's independence from politics and
thereby enhance the Court's reputation. Roberts was a foil, a maguffin
whom Frankfurter used for the Court's benefit. The memorandum
was "ambiguous and contrived," but for reasons that have little to do
with Roberts.
KELLY & HARBISON, THIRD EDITION, supra note 218, at 759.
220 Id.
221 KELLY & HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 764; see also GLENDON A.
219

SCHUBERT,

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF SUPREME COURT JUS-

TICES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES THAT THEY MAKE 168 (1969) (suggesting that a

quantitative analysis of the Court's decisions indicated "that both Hughes and Roberts switched
in the term of the Court-packing fight," but tempering the conclusion by stating that the Roberts
memorandum was "a powerful rebuttal" to his quantitative analysis).
222 See Chambers, supra note 146, at 45 passim.
223 Id. at 73; see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 175 (ig6o)
(concluding that some combination of FDR's reelection victory, labor unrest, and the courtpacking plan led to Roberts's turnabout).
224 Chambers, supra note 146, at 67.
22s Edward Corwin also made the argument that Hughes and Roberts were affected by labor
unrest when they changed their votes. See CORWIN, supra note 70, at 73. Robert McCloskey
suggested the same of Roberts. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 223, at 175; see also LEO PFEFFER,
THIS HONORABLE COURT 320 (1965) ("It is of little moment whether the switch in time that

saved nine was made in December of 1936 or February of 1937. In either case, its explanation
lies in political rather than judicial terms.").
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E.
The final path by which the revised history took hold was through
Frankfurter's biographers. 226 For them, the most difficult question to
answer, in order to evaluate the court-packing episode, was whether
Frankfurter's private correspondence in the spring of 1937 could be
reconciled with his public defense of Roberts nearly a generation
227
later.
Max Freedman, Frankfurter's hand-picked biographer 228 and the
person who first made public Frankfurter's letter to FDR, gave the
initial and still generally accepted explanation. Freedman explained
that Frankfurter "deeply regretted this letter, '2 29 and that one purpose
230
of Frankfurter's tribute to Roberts was to "correct[] this mistake."
226 Evaluating the impact of the court-packing plan and the "switch in time" was also
important to Franklin Roosevelt's biographers. In 1941, FDR claimed that he lost the battle
but won the war by waging his fight to reorganize the judiciary. See 6 PUBLIC PAPERS: THE
CONSTITUTION PREVAILS, supra note 12, at lxvi-lxx. But the fourth and most recent volume
of Kenneth Davis's biography of FDR, after delving deeply into the crisis of 1937, comes to a
much different conclusion. Using the Roberts memorandum for support, although critical of
Roberts's "disingenuous" claims, Davis writes: "Roosevelt's court message had no such causal
efficacy as he later claimed for it." DAVIS, supra note ii, at 99. Given this view, Davis
concludes more broadly:
[Roosevelt's] sadly mistaken court-packing effort effectively ended the New Deal as a
reforming, transforming social force - effectively destroyed the possibility that the New
Deal could achieve those "practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish
men," could "create those moral controls over the services of science . . . necessary to
make science a useful servant instead of a ruthless master of mankind," that Roosevelt
had named in his second inaugural as fundamental objectives of his administration.
Id. at 99-ioo.
227 A related question Frankfurter's biographers have wrestled with is whether Frankfurter,
who refused to state publicly his views on FDR's court-packing plan, supported the plan.
Although Frankfurter's critics argue that he privately detested the court-packing plan but refused
to denounce FDR publicly because he desired a seat on the Supreme Court, see, e.g., DOUGLAS,
supra note 169, at 324, the consensus is that, although Frankfurter disapproved of the plan, he
was willing to forgo publicly voicing his disapproval in order to remain loyal to President
Roosevelt. Compare BAYER, supra note 168, at 326-28 (concluding that Frankfurter privately
opposed the plan but remained silent to support FDR); BAKER, supra note 51, at 186-87 (same);
NELSON L. DAWSON, LouIs D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL 142

(198o) (same); Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in LASH, supra note 84, at 59 (same);
and HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 31 (i96o)
(same) with PARRISH, supra note 54, at 269 (concluding that Frankfurter believed the greater
evil was the Court, not FDR's plan); and UROFSKY, supra note 215, at 44 (same). Frankfurter
refused a request from a doctoral candidate in history to state publicly his views regarding the
court-packing plan I5 years after the fact. See Letter from E. Kimbark MacColl to Justice
Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 18, 1952), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers,
supra note 78, at Container x81 (including handwritten note from Frankfurter indicating refusal
to state publicly his opinion).
228 See Max Freedman, Justice Frankfurter and Judicial Review, in FREEDMAN, BEANEY
& RoSTOW, supra note 216, at 1, 4.

9, at 392.
On reconciling Frankfurter's earlier and later views, Leonard Baker seemed paralyzed

229 ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note

230 Id.
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Freedman (or is it Frankfurter?) continued by stating that the accusation of Roberts's switch arose from "conduct gravely misunderstood
not only by the public but by the legal profession."'2 3 1 This explanation thus defused criticism of Roberts's actions by laying blame on
Frankfurter's mistaken impression in 1937.
Frankfurter biographer and historian Michael Parrish dissents.
Relying on his own survey of the evidence regarding Roberts's
switch, 23 2 Parrish concluded that Frankfurter's privately expressed
view in 1937 was correct 233 and that Frankfurter's tribute was farther
from the truth. 2 34 What Parrish did not explain, however, was why
it was important to Frankfurter for the revisionist history to succeed.
The opinion that I believe is closest to the truth is expressed by
Professor H.N. Hirsch in his psychological biography of Frankfurter. 235 Hirsch notes that Frankfurter wanted history to prove that
"Roberts had, after all, not really switched his votes during the Courtpacking fight."236 Hirsch also notes that Frankfurter regularly wrote
to Paul Freund, "The historian of the Supreme Court, '23 7 about his
views of the events of the Hughes Court. This was, as Hirsch states,
part of Frankfurter's efforts "to leave his legacy by shaping history to
'238
agree with his interpretation of events.
by Frankfurter's tribute when compared to his evidence, which indicated a flip by Justice
Roberts. See BAKER, supra note x68, at 177. Professor Urofsky is alone in believing that
Frankfurter both supported FDR's court-packing plan and that Roberts apparently did not
"switch." Urofsky did not cite Frankfurter's tribute, but noted that, "[i]n
fact, as later evidence
has shown, Roberts had decided to vote for the measure well before Roosevelt announced his
plan." UROFSKY, supra note 215, at 196 n.5o.
231 ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 9, at 393. This language is suspiciously
similar to the language used by Frankfurter in his tribute. See supra p. 635.
232 See Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians,
40 HISTORAN 286, 296-97 (1978) (concluding that Roberts switched as a result of FDR's
resounding reelection).
233 See ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 9, at 392.
234 See Parrish, supra note 232, at 296-97. The purpose of Parrish's Hughes Court article

was to compare the histories of the New Deal by the "legal realist" scholars, including Corwin,
Wright, Mason, and McCloskey, with later histories by conservative revisionists, including
Swindler and Freund, and New Left historians of the ig6os and early 1970s. Although this
insightful article does a wonderful job of picking apart the histories of those whose desires lead
them either to protect or to attack the Court, Parrish fails to grasp the importance of this
revisionist history in the legal thought of reasoned elaboration, and the centrality of Felix
Frankfurter to the legal thought of reasoned elaboration.
235 See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGNIA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981).
236 Id. at I99. Hirsch concludes that Frankfurter's tribute was an attempt to resurrect

Roberts's reputation, but doesn't evaluate the success of Frankfurter's efforts. See id. at 247
n.97; see also Spillenger, supra note 215, at 13l (noting that "[tihe preservation of Brandeis's
reputation and the transmission of the Brandeis 'word' [by 1943] became an absorbing concern
for Frankfurter").
237Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School
(July i6, 1958), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel I5.
238 HIRSCH, supra note 235, at 198.
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What Hirsch fails to give us is a reason why Frankfurter would
have tried to shape history to declare that Roberts had not really
switched. Frankfurter engaged in this undertaking, in my view, to
protect the virtue and integrity of the Supreme Court, again under
attack after the Court decided Brown.
VI.
Americans have taken pride in the independence of their judges, and
the Brown case may well be the leading symbol of judicial independence.
CASS

R.

SUNSTEIN,

How

INDEPENDENT IS THE COURT?

23 9

A.
Included in the Felix Frankfurter Papers at the Harvard Law
School Library is a clipping of a letter to the editor concerning the
death of Owen Roberts printed in The London Times. The newspaper
headline above the letter is "Mr. Owen Roberts" and directly underneath, "The Rule of Law." The author, "L.C.," wrote in part: "Those
who knew [Roberts] knew that he resigned because he considered that
the Ark of the Covenant of the American Constitution - the Supreme
Court - was being desecrated by considerations of domestic politics. '240 In a 196o letter to William 0. Douglas, Frankfurter wrote,
"I expect from [my law clerks] if not my own religious attitude toward
the Court as an institution at least a goodly portion of reverence for
'24 1
its responsibilities in our national life."
This religious imagery serves to explain Justice Frankfurter's desire
to protect the Court. Frankfurter had an absolute faith in the Court.
As he once wrote, his life "ha[d] been dedicated to the faith in the
disinterestedness of a tribunal." 2 42 The Roberts memorandum was a
239 Cass R. Sunstein, How Independent Is the Court?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1992,
at 47.
240 Mr. Owen Roberts: The Rule of Law, TIMES (London), May 25, 1955, at 13, microformed
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part IHI, Reel 3. I have been unable to
ascertain the identity of "L.C." There is no indication from my research that Roberts, a religious
man, ever viewed the Court in such religious terms. Statements in this letter make clear that
"L.C." possessed an intimate knowledge of both Roberts and the Court.
241 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice William 0. Douglas (Mar. 23, ig6o),
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part I, Reel i; see also HIRSCH,
supra note 235, at 187 ("For the fact is that I have for a considerable time been carrying myself
with the thought that, perhaps, the best service I could render an institution that has semisacred implications for me was to resign and state fully my reasons - including Stone's major
responsibility for the state of things." (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Learned
Hand, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 27, 1946)).
242 PARRISH, supra note 54, at 272 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski (Apr. 13, 1937)).
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hole card for Frankfurter to play if a decision or set of decisions
suggested that the Court was enmeshed in the "turbulence of politics"
as during the years 1935-1937.
The law/politics split was central to Frankfurter's vision of the
American democratic experiment,2 4 3 and that split was pivotal to postWorld War II legal thought. 24 4 Indeed, this split was central to
reasoned elaboration in part because one of the lessons legal progressives (and their heirs) drew from Lochner v. New York 245 was that
the members of the Court were duty-bound to avoid injecting their
subjective political and philosophical values into constitutional law.
As evidenced by recent Supreme Court decisions, 246 that split remains
vital in justifying an independent judiciary. For Frankfurter and
others, 24 7 it was not necessary to prove to political scientists that
243 This is most clearly shown in the infamous case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947). The issue was whether, after failing once, it was cruel and unusual
punishment for the state of Louisiana to try for a second time to kill Willie Francis. The Court
held that it was not. See id. at 463. In a concurrence, Frankfurter wrote, "we cannot escape
acknowledging that [the constitutional issue] involves the application of standards of fairness
and justice very broadly conceived. They are not the application of merely personal standards
but the impersonal standards of society which alone judges, as the organs of Law, are empowered
to enforce." Id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). After deciding that the state could execute
Francis, Frankfurter worked behind the scenes to prevent Francis's execution. He was not
successful. For more on Justice Frankfurter's vision of the division between law and politics,
see Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, 69 HARv. L. REV. 217, 22732 (I955); Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirrorof Justices, xo5 U. PA. L. REV.
781, 794 (1957) (reprinting the First Owen J. Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School) (rejecting "the impression that a Justice of the Court is left at large to exercise his
private wisdom"); Felix Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process
of Supreme Court Litigation, 98 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 233, 238 (1954), reprinted as The
Process of Judging in the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEws FROM INSIDE 34,
42-43 (Alan F. Westin ed., ig6i) (propounding the view "that [a judge] is there not to impose
his private views upon society, that he is not to enforce personalized justice").
244 1 have discussed this intellectual history in the context of the codification of the law of
evidence. See Michael Ariens, ProgressIs Our Only Product:Legal Reform and the Codification
of Evidence, 17 LAW & SOC'L INQ. 213, 247-52 (1992). On the realist-process jurisprudence
difference regarding "constitutionalism," see Herman Belz, Changing Conceptions of Constitutionalism in the Era of World War II and the Cold War, 59 J. AM. HIST. 640 passim (1972).
For an incisive evaluation of Alexander Bickel, the most prominent constitutional scholar during
the period of reasoned elaboration, see generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel
and the Post-Realist Constitution, ii HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 passin (1976).
245 i98 U.S. 45 (I905).

246 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. x86, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's.... '); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992) (linking Lochner and West Coast Hotel and
explaining that "facts" required the latter case to announce a new principle and overrule Adkins).
247 Not coincidentally, legal scholars who joined Frankfurter to defend Roberts's actions,
from Erwin Griswold to Arthur Sutherland to Paul Freund, were all professors at the Harvard
Law School and former students or colleagues of Frankfurter there.
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Roberts (and possibly Hughes) was motivated by concerns of reason
and judgment, or craft and principle. It was only necessary that
preeminent legal scholars relay that message to law students and
lawyers. Publication of the Roberts memorandum created the opportunity to claim that judgment (law) rather than will (politics) was
responsible for Roberts's decisions, and allowed that message to be
sent to legal scholars.

B.
When the constitutional revolution came, as we indicated when
we were talking about Roosevelt's court-packing plan at an earlier
meeting, the problems for all of us became: How can we defend a
judicial veto in areas where we thought it helpful in American life civil liberties area, personal freedom, First Amendment - and at the
same
time condemn it in the areas where we considered it unhelp2 48
ful.

After the constitutional crisis of 1937, legal scholars feared the
intrusion of "politics" in the Court, and this fear led them to look for
ways to prevent judgment from becoming will. The difficulty was
that politics could intrude from within, when a Justice voted based
on his predilections, or without, when, for example, a Justice voted
based on pressure from the President.
Frankfurter's explanation of Roberts's actions in 1937 became the
accepted history not because Frankfurter elucidated "indisputable
facts," but rather because this history better enabled legal scholars to
defend the independence of the Court, which Brown had placed in
some doubt. 24 9 When Justice Frankfurter found a "lawful" resolution

to Brown, the happy coincidence of his personal views with the re25 0
quirements of the Constitution was just that, a happy coincidence.

248 Silber & Miller, supra note 14, at 924 (quoting Herbert Wechsler).
249 Thus, I disagree with Professor Horwitz's conclusion that Brown "produced a sharply
critical reaction among elite legal thinkers." MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, I870-I96O: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 258 (i992).
250 Frankfurter's role in Brown is the subject of much dispute. The standard story is set
forth in Richard Kluger's i975 book, Simple Justice, in which Frankfurter is viewed as an
active proponent for holding segregated education unconstitutional. See RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE 599-6oo (1975); see also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, i948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I, 36 n.284 (1979) (noting
commentators' wide variety of views about Frankfurter's position on Brown). Compare Philip
Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter,and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946196o: An Oral History, ioo HARV. L. REv. 817, 828 (1987) (suggesting, through the use of an
oral history, that Frankfurter gave the Solicitor General's office information concerning the
probable votes of other Justices) with Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, ioo HARv.
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For legal scholars sympathetic to the aims of the plaintiffs in Brown,
the goal was to justify the exercise of the judicial veto as both lawful
and "helpful."
The result was that, from 1954 to 1959, Brown was defended by
legal academics as vitally important to American society and also as
a legally unexceptional decision. 25 ' Writing in 1954, Harvard Law
School Professor Albert M. Sacks concluded that Brown "illustrates
the functioning of the judicial process at its best." 25 2 The next year,
Sacks's colleague Robert Braucher, whose Foreword began with the
caution that "[t]here will be no praise here for 'judicial statesman-

L. REV. 1938 (1987) (suggesting that oral history misleads historians about the path up to and
including Brown). Hutchinson states that, whatever Frankfurter's views, by the Court's December 1953 conference, Frankfurter had realized that a majority of the Court planned to hold
segregated schooling unconstitutional. See Hutchinson, supra, at 39; see also Tushnet & Lezin,
supra note 15, at 1872-75, 1918-29 (detailing and criticizing the standard story of Frankfurter's
role in Brown). Professor Tushnet's interpretation is that Frankfurter's dilemma in Brown was
to find a "legal" rather than a "political" solution. See id. at 1919-20. In commenting on the
Court's 1953 deliberations in Brown, Professor Tushnet writes:
Frankfurter, seeking a judicial rather than a political resolution to the question, looked
for support in judicial precedent and custom, but could not find it there. His resources
as a lawyer were exhausted without turning up a legal justification for what he agreed
was a 'congenial' political solution. As a result, when the discussion reached the merits
of Brown, Frankfurter was essentially paralyzed; there was nothing he could say that
simultaneously satisfied his desire to overturn segregation and his insistence that the
Court must act judicially rather than politically.
Id. Professor Tushnet concludes that once Frankfurter was able to view the remedy in Brown
as legal rather than political, his doubts were resolved. See id. at I92o. I am convinced by
Tushnet's interpretation of Frankfurter's role in Brown, and I believe that it suggests a reason
why Frankfurter's revisionist history of the crisis of 1937 was important in defending Brown.
2S1 See Robert Braucher, The Supreme Court, 1954 Term Foreword, 69 HARV. L. REv.
120, 120-23 (1955); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 3o N.Y.U. L. REv. 15o, x5o (I955); George
L. DeLacy, Segregation Cases: A Judicial Problem Judicially Solved, 43 A.B.A. J. 519, 52021 (i957); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term Foreword: Attack on the
Segregation Cases, 70 HARv. L. REv. 83, 85-92 (i956); Paul A. Freund, Storm Over the
American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REv. 345, 350-51 (958); Paul A. Freund, The Supreme
Court Crisis, 31 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 66, 66-70 (1959) [hereinafter Freund, Supreme Court
Crisis]; Paul G. Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson,
52 MICH. L. REV. 1137, ii55-56 (i954); Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed":
Legislative Reaction and JudicialDevelopment, 1956-57, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1078 (1956);
Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term - Foreword, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 96-99
(i954); see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision,
69 HAv. L. REv. x, 1 (i955) (stating that "the record of history" invited the Brown decision);
cf. Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, The FourteenthAmendment and the Will of Stephen Girard,
66 YALE L.J. 979, 981 (957) ("In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court, speaking the
conscience of a majority of the nation, took a giant step in the evolution of full equality for the
Negroes."). Of course, reaction in the south was much more critical. See, e.g., C.K. Brown,
White South is a Minority Group: Supreme Court Cannot Bestow White Man's Inheritance on
Another Race, 17 ALA. LAv. 438, 439-40 (1956); Herman E. Talmadge, School Systems,
Segregation and the Supreme Court, 6 MERCER L. REv. 189, 190 (i955).
252

Sacks, supra note

251,

at 96.
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ship,"' because the phrase often was used "to praise unstated and even
unjudicial reasons for decision, '25 3 offered the opinion that "even as
a matter of hindsight it is hard to suggest how the Court could have
decided [the remedy in Brown] better except perhaps by deciding
sooner." 25 4 Professor Edmond Cahn suggested that Brown "spared
the nation a genuine constitutional crisis, and that in this exigency
255
the institution of judicial review rendered an invaluable service."
If Brown was lawful, then it was authoritative, and thus required
obedience by state officials. The first civil rights act of the twentieth
century would not be passed until 1957, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which named and explicitly adopted Brown, was a decade away.
Although Eisenhower ordered the District of Columbia to desegregate
its schools in advance of specific court orders, 25 6 he was conspicuously
silent about Brown. Only a few months after the Court issued the
remedy in Brown requiring those public schools to desegregate "with
all deliberate speed," the nation learned about the acquittal of men in
Mississippi who had lynched a fourteen-year-old boy from Chicago
named Emmett Till. 25 7 In December 1955, Rosa Parks would make
history for refusing to move to the back of the bus. 25 8 In early 1956,
southern officials first coined the phrase "massive resistance" to
the Brown mandate, 25 9 and from 1957 to 1959, the nation watched

mobs in Little Rock, Arkansas, react violently to court-ordered desegregation of Central High. The crisis Professor Cahn believed the
Court had spared the nation had arrived.
Writing to a colleague about the continuing crisis in Little Rock,
Arkansas, Frankfurter commented that obedience to Brown would be
based on "the transcendingissue of the Supreme Court as the authoritative organ of what the Constitution requires. '260 When southern
Braucher, supra note 251, at 120.
Id. at 123.
25S Cahn, supra note 251, at 157.
253

254

256 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63,
at 113 (1988).
257 See JUAN WILLIAMS, EES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-65,
at 37-57 (1987). This is the companion book to the magnificent documentary of the same name.
258 See id. at 59-89; BRANCH, supra note 256, at 128-205.
259 See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE III (1969) (attributing the

origin of the phrase to Virginia Senator Harry Byrd); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE 55 (1973) (same).
260 TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 151
(1984) (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice John M. Harlan (Sept. Ii, 1958)
(emphasis added)). This letter was sent to Harlan shortly before the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. I (1958), reaffirmed Brown and ordered desegregation of Central High in Little Rock,
see id. at i7-2o. The most famous statement in Cooper is similar to Frankfurter's language in

his letter: "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system." Id. at i8.
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segregationists used the discredited doctrines of interposition and
states' rights to make legalistic challenges to Brown,2 61 they won the
popular battle (for a while), but they were bound to lose the legal
war. The crisis in Little Rock provides evidence of this. Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus's decision to forbid Negro students from entering Little Rock Central High in 1957 made him a popular governor,
but also led President Eisenhower to send the ioist Airborne Division
to Little Rock to protect the students. Eisenhower explained on national television that "[m]ob rule cannot be allowed to override the
decisions of our courts" and that "the foundation of the American
way of life is our national respect for law. ' 262 Frankfurter ingeniously
perceived that this struggle was not about the narrow subject of
Brown; this struggle was really about the faith of Americans in the
authority of the Supreme Court. That authority was more firmly
grounded after the "true" explanation of Roberts's actions was published.
In early 1959, Paul Freund defended the Supreme Court from
"irresponsible attacks. '263 He began by restating the lawfulness of
Brown 264 and concluded by defending the Court's First Amendment
and Due Process decisions. But it is the title of Freund's address,
The Supreme Court Crisis,2 65 that sparks the most attention. 266 A
generation earlier, Merlo Pusey had used the same title to discuss
FDR's court-packing plan and Roberts's change of mind. Freund
makes no mention of Supreme Court crises as a recurring theme, in
part because the revised history of the earlier "crisis" demonstrated
that in 1937 Roberts had acted as a principled judge. According to
Freund, the crisis in the late 1950s was the result of an improper
understanding by many public officials of the Court's role in the
261

supra note 260, at 63-86.
supra note 257, at 107 (quoting Eisenhower's nationally televised speech).
Freund, Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 251, at 70. One of those attacks was made
See

FREYER,

262 WILLIAMS,
263

by the Conference of State Chief Justices. See id. at 72-8o (defending the Court from a charge
by the Conference). On August 23, 1958, at the height of the Little Rock crisis, the Conference
voted 36-8 to condemn the Court for taking "the role of policy-maker without proper judicial
restraint." See Eugene V. Rostow, The Court and Its Critics, 4 So. TEX. L.J. z6o, 168-78
(1959) (quoting the resolution and defending the Court).
264 Freund wrote:
A final obvious fact is that the decisions were not an abrupt departure in constitutional
law or a novel interpretation of the guarantee of equal protection of the law. The old
doctrine of separate-but-equal, announced in 1898, had been steadily eroded for at least
a generation before the school cases, in the way that precedents are whittled down until
they finally collapse.
Freund, Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 25x, at 68.
265 Freund, Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 25!.
266 In asserting the importance of incremental change, of slowly whittling away "bad" precedent, of acting as a "moderating" influence in society, of approaching the task of deciding as
a "craftsman," and of relying on the singular importance of process, it is also an excellent
example of post-World War IU legal thought.
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democratic framework, not the Court's decisions. There is not the
slightest suggestion that it was "deja vu all over again," because, for
him, it wasn't. Freund's defense was to show that the Court simply
was undertaking its traditional duty as the authoritative organ of what
the Constitution required.
By the time Professor Herbert Wechsler attacked as unprincipled
the Court's reasoning in Brown in his 1959 Holmes lecture,2 67 the
revisionist history of the constitutional crisis of i937 was already in
place. 268 The new story of Roberts's actions gave legal scholars another reason to trust the Court with the power of judicial review.
Entrusting the Court with the judicial veto, as Frankfurter well knew,
would transcend the Court's opinion in Brown, despite Wechsler's
criticisms.2

69

It was enough to "persuade the persuadable" 270 of the

Court's integrity and virtue, and enough to prevent critics in the I95Os
27 1
from using the constitutional crisis of 1937 as precedent.
267 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959). Wechsler's Holmes lecture was given on April 7, 1959.
268 Wechsler was barred from claiming the constitutional crisis of 1937 as precedent because
he apparently accepted the Frankfurter revised history. In 196o, Wechsler gave the Owen J.
Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, in which he cited Frankfurter's tribute and
concluded that Roberts's switch had been "falsely publicized." Wechsler, supra note i65, at 465
(footnote omitted). Cf. Silber & Miller, supra note i4, at 872-73 (stating that during one of a
series of interviews by the authors of Professor Wechsler between 1978-82, the following question
and answer is reported: "Do you feel that the court-packing plan proposed by PresidentRoosevelt
in 1937 and the change in direction that the Supreme Court took following that event amounted
to a constitutional revolution against the closed system on the Court? Yes, I certainly do. I
think Jones & Laughlin was a revolution, a constitutional revolution. And, don't forget, the
Social Security Act was also sustained." (footnotes omitted)). It is unclear from the manner in
which the question was put whether Wechsler's belief that there was a "constitutional revolution"
was a result of the court-packing plan. The reader should note that Wechsler's answer makes
no mention of West Coast Hotel.
269 In this view, the "crisis" generated by Wechsler's article was part of an internal debate
among the heirs to the legal progressives about the Court's role in the democratic scheme.
Following Wechsler's criticism, the search for the "lawful" nature of Brown became the search
for the foundations of constitutional law. The justification of Brown has since shifted from its
"lawfulness" to its "justness." See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in ConstitutionalInterpretation,
79 VA. L. REV. 583, 583-84 & nn.4-7, 619-2o (i993). The influence of the realists on PostWorld War H legal thought in cordoning off "moral" arguments is discussed in Ariens, supra
note 244, at 247-52.

See also HoRwrrz, supra note 249, at 258 (arguing that Brown shattered

the postwar ideal that the law was value-free); cf. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1014 (1965) (arguing that the doctrine of neutral
principles does not "exclude value judgments from interpretation, as some others have alleged.").
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (i973) (describing the linkage between moral

relativism and legal realism).
270 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 223, at 216.
271 In his 1959 Holmes lecture, Wechsler never sought to bolster his claim by citing to the

crisis of 1937. See Wechsler, supra note 267, at 31-35. In his Holmes lectures of the previous
year, Judge Learned Hand, who argued against the power of judicial review and concluded
that Brown was a "legislative" and not a "judicial" decision, never mentioned FDR's court
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For those looking to eliminate the Court's role as the "authoritative
organ of what the Constitution requires, ' 272 Justice Frankfurter's revision of Justice Roberts's shift from "political" to "principled" left few
avenues down which opponents of the Court could travel to attack
the Court's authority. 273 As Frankfurter suggested, obedience to the
dictates of Brown would result from acceptance of the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution, not from a particularized assessment of the correctness of Brown. In voting to hold "separate but
equal" public education unconstitutional in Brown, Justice Frankfurter
properly performed his role as priest in the temple; in revising the
history of the crisis of 1937 Justice Frankfurter properly performed
his longer-running role as guardian of the Court's virtue.
C.
The initial version of Roberts's switch could be associated readily
with a base law=politics version of legal realism, although the revisionist history comported better with process jurisprudence, because
it explained that the difference in Roberts's votes in Morehead and
West Coast Hotel was based on principle rather than politics.
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The

fortuity of Roberts's death on the first anniversary of Brown allowed
reorganization plan, the West Coast Hotel or Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions, or the constitutional crisis of 1937. See HAND, supra note 118.
272 FREYER, supra note 260, at 15i(quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice
John M. Harlan (Sept. i, 1958)).
273 In addition to their long friendship, this might explain why Frankfurter so heartily
congratulated Hand on the success of his Holmes Lectures, which were many years in the
making. Frankfurter noted Hand's view that Brown was a "legislative" rather than "judicial"
opinion, and then told Hand that, had he been faced with Brown, Frankfurter was confident
that Hand would have voted to declare segregated schools unconstitutional. See Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Judge Learned Hand (retired) (Feb. 13, 1958), microformed on Library of
Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 65.
274 But see FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 221 (1955) ("Roberts is the perfect personification of
the chanciness of government by judges."). In Rodell's version, the Supreme Court was able to
avoid the imposition of the court-packing plan because the average American citizen was in
awe of the Court, and because of Hughes's sagacious leadership. See id. at 247. Rodell was
aware of the timing of the conference vote in West Coast Hotel, but remained convinced that
Roberts had switched his vote. As a Yale law professor long associated with legal realism,
Rodell also delighted in noting the political nature of judging and the judiciary. "[T]he constitutional theories of all politicians, including Supreme Court Justices, are no more than highfaluting ways of arguing for the political ends they are really after," id. at 217, and "the Court
was a rather random collection of nine men exercising a political function atop one of the three
branches of the federal government," id. at 247. Rodell also suggested that FDR's reelection
might have been the impetus for Roberts's change, although that "must remain a matter of
informed conjecture - at least until intimate memoirs are possibly published at a decent interval
after the death of Roberts, the last survivor of the Nine Old Men." Id. at 243. On Rodell's
antipathy toward Frankfurter and Harvard Law School, see KALMAN, supra note 209, at 14547, 201, 294 n.8o.
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A THRICE-TOLD TALE

Frankfurter and those more sympathetic to a legal rationale to use
this revised history to bolster acceptance of the Court's authority to
decide the constitutionality of state and federal laws, including, most
contentiously, state laws mandating segregation. In this way, the
institution, and thus the independence of the Court, might be protected from charges of "lawlessness," or more currently, "politics."
If the integrity of our democratic framework required a commitment to civil rights for Negroes, and if the judiciary was the only
branch of the federal government able to create a constitutional framework to implement civil rights, then it was crucial that the Court
maintain its integrity. The revised history was one effort to provide
a foundation for that integrity. At the time Frankfurter wrote his
tribute (and continuing through today), judicial independence from
politics was a necessary prerequisite to judicial integrity. Professor
Sunstein is right: Brown is the Court's leading symbol of judicial
independence.2 75 Part of the reason Brown is so viewed is that a
plausible story of the Court's fidelity to law, including the events of
1937, made it easier to sell Brown as a permissible interpretation of
the Constitution in the face of massive resistance. Justice Felix Frankfurter helped to create and disseminate that plausible story.
VII.
Justice Frankfurter began his tribute to Justice Roberts with this
statement: "The dictum that history cannot be written without documents is less than a half-truth if it implies that it can be written
from them." 276 Justice Frankfurter's wise advice is a caution to anyone trying to write about "what really happened," or anyone trying
to write about what someone else claims really happened. But Justice
Frankfurter failed to heed his own advice; relying heavily on a "document" to explain Justice Roberts's "switch" cannot rewrite the history
of the crisis of 1937.

275 See Sunstein, supra note 239, at 47.
276 Frankfurter, supra note io, at 311. In a 196o conversation with Gerald Gunther, Justice

Frankfurter recalled that this view grew out of a conversation he had had with Charles Beard.
See Transcribed Interview of Felix Frankfurter by Gerald Gunther, Sept. IS, I96O, at x6,
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 28 ("Charlie once
said to me, 'You can't write documents - you can't write history without documents - without
documents.' And I said, 'Charlie, if you'll only add to that, you can't write history merely out
of documents.'" (Justice Frankfurter speaking)); see also Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter
to Professor Thomas Reed Powell (June ig, 1944), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers,
supra note 78, at Part I, Reel 18 ("(x) while documents are indispensable to the writing of
history, disclosed documents alone are obviously insufficient; (2)even if one has all the documents, public and private, in themselves they are not the full or final voices of truth.").
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Commenting on Judge Learned Hand's memorial tribute to Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Paul Freund wrote, "Memorial addresses
often provide an even truer insight into the speaker than into the
subject .... "277 Never was this more true than when Justice Frankfurter gave tribute to Justice Roberts.
277 PAUL
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